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The Roberts Court and Administrative Law 
(Forthcoming, 2018 Supreme Court Review) 
 
Gillian E. Metzger* 
 
 
Administrative law today is marked by the legal equivalent of mortal combat, where 
foundational principles are fiercely disputed and basic doctrines are offered up for “execution.”1 
Several factors have led to administrative law’s currently fraught status. Increasingly bold 
presidential assertions of executive power are one, with President Trump and President Obama 
before him using presidential control over administration to advance controversial policies that 
failed to get congressional sanction.2 In the process, they have deeply enmeshed administrative 
agencies in political battles—indeed, for President Trump, administrative agencies are the political 
battle, as his administration has waged an all-out war on parts of the national bureaucracy.3  These 
bold assertions of administrative authority stem in part from Congress’s inability to address 
pressing problems, with political polarization, intense partisanship, and near parity between the 
main parties often leading to legislative gridlock.4 The contemporary political climate also means 
that fights over administrative actions have become fierce and unrelenting. Moreover, the 
combination of these two developments—aggressive administrative advancement of presidential 
agendas in a deeply partisan and polarized world—has spurred a significant uptick in politically-
charged administrative law litigation, epitomized by the dramatic expansion in red state and blue 
state lawsuits challenging executive branch actions they oppose.5  In addition, conservative groups 
have put sustained efforts into fostering academic attacks on core features of administrative 
government, efforts that have provided the intellectual scaffolding for today’s doctrinal disputes.6  
                                                 
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, Olati Johnson, Tom Merrill, Daphna Renan, and David Strauss for extremely helpful comments and to 
Dustin Graber and Charles See for excellent research assistance, including acquiring knowledge of the Chicago 
citation style. 
1 Kisor v Wilkie, 139 S Ct 2400, 2425 (2019). 
2 For examples of “bold attempts to accrete executive power” in both the Obama and Trump administrations, see Jerry 
L. Mashaw and David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent 
American Experience, 35 Yale J Reg 549, 550 (2018). 
3 See Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State” (The New Yorker, May 14, 2018), archived at 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state.   
4 See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum L Rev 1739, 1748–49, 1757–58 (2015); 
see also Jody Freeman and David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U Pa L Rev 1, 17–63 (2014) 
(providing detailed examples of how congressional gridlock may prompt agencies to use their authority under 
preexisting statutes to address newly emerging regulatory challenges). 
5 See Lawsuits (State Energy & Environmental Impact Center, July 31, 2019), archived at 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions/active-lawsuits (listing 63 active law suit against the Trump 
Administration with 34 filed or joined by California and 26 by New York); Neena Satija, Texas vs. the Feds—A Look 
at the Lawsuits (The Texas Tribune, Jan 17, 2017), archived at https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/17/texas-
federal-government-lawsuits/ (highlighting that the state of Texas sued the Obama Administration 48 times during his 
two terms). 
6 See, for example, Jane Mayer, Dark Money:  The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical 
Right 2–10 (Doubleday 2016) (describing Charles and David Koch’s extensive funding of anti-administrative political 
organizations). 





And, finally, there is the Trump Administration’s emphasis on selecting judges who are receptive 
to these conservative attacks on administrative governance in court.7 
 
 A particularly important contributor to administrative law’s contested status is the Roberts 
Court.  The replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor with Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito brought a new skepticism about administrative government to the 
Supreme Court.  Meanwhile, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas did 180 degree turns in their 
approaches to administrative law, penning attacks on administrative law decisions they themselves 
had authored just a few years earlier.8  Justice Gorsuch’s elevation to the Court added another 
strident administrative skeptic to the mix,9 and by his final term on the Court even Justice Kennedy 
had joined the ranks of administrative law’s critics.10  
  
This judicial skepticism of administrative government, which I have elsewhere labeled 
anti-administrativism, is heavily constitutional, marked by a formalist and originalist approach to 
the separation of powers, a deep distrust of bureaucracy, and a strong turn to the courts to protect 
individuals against administrative excess and restore the original constitutional order.11  Several 
opinions demonstrated these traits in the lead up to the 2018 Term, from the Court’s decision in 
Free Enterprise Fund v PCAOB striking down double-for-cause removal protection, to Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence in Department of Transportation v Association of American Railroads 
attacking modern delegation, to Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington v FCC 
rejecting deference to agency jurisdictional determinations, to the many concurrences in Perez v 
Mortgage Bankers Association calling deference to agency regulatory interpretations into 
question.12  But perhaps the clearest example is the ongoing debate over Chevron deference, or the 
doctrine that a court should defer to a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision 
offered by the agency charged with its implementation.13 The most cited administrative law 
decision for decades, Chevron has been under full-blown assault at the Supreme Court since 2015, 
when Justice Thomas condemned the practice of courts deferring to agency statutory 
                                                 
7 See Jason Zengerie, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts (NY Times Mag Aug 22, 2018), archived 
at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html (describing the judicial 
appointment process under Trump and the role played by the Federalist Society). 
8 Compare Michigan v EPA, 135 S Ct 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring) (Chevron deference 
unconstitutionally requires courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes) with National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services, 545 US 967, 982–83 (2005) (Thomas, J) (requiring 
courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, even if the court has already interpreted the 
statute differently).  For Justice Scalia’s changed view on his Auer opinion, see text accompanying notes 30–33. 
9 Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1158 (10th Cir 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring) (arguing that Chevron 
deference is unconstitutional). 
10 Pereira v Sessions, 138 S Ct 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J, concurring) (finding the “reflexive deference” 
exhibited in certain applications of Chevron deference “troubling”). 
11 Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux:  The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 Harv L Rev 1, 3–4, 33–46 (2017). 
12 Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 US 477, 495–99 (2010); Department of 
Transportation v American Railroads, 135 S Ct 1225, 1246, 1251 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment); 
City of Arlington v FCC, 569 US 290, 314–16 (2013) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting); Perez v Mortgage Bankers 
Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1210–25 (2015) (concurrences by Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ). 
13 Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 842–43 (1984). See also United States v Mead, 
533 US 218, 226–27 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference in addition to instances where the agency has the power to 
issue rules with the force of law and exercised that authority in issuing the interpretation in question). 





interpretations as violating Article III and creating unconstitutional delegations.14  Although 
Thomas made his argument in an opinion concurring in the judgment that no one else joined, by 
Pereira v Sessions three years later there appeared to be at least four justices who considered 
Chevron deference to be constitutionally problematic,15 and the Court itself has not relied on 
Chevron deference since 2014.16 
 
 Still, a striking feature of the Roberts Court’s anti-administrativism before the 2018 Term 
was its largely rhetorical character. Although several justices waxed expansively about an out-of-
control national bureaucracy, the most dramatic attacks on the administrative state’s 
constitutionality and administrative law were largely restricted to concurrences and dissents. The 
occasional majority opinions invalidating administrative arrangements on constitutional grounds 
were notably narrow, cabining their analysis with carve outs and remedial minimalism.17 And the 
Court was adept in its avoidance tactics, for example repeatedly determining that statutes were 
unambiguous and thereby sidestepping the need to take on the debate over Chevron’s 
constitutionality.18  In short, for all of its alarmism about bureaucrats running amok and assertions 
that the contemporary administrative state violates the constitutional order, the Roberts Court 
hadn’t yet pulled back significantly on administrative governance in practice.   
 
Thus, the increasingly burning question was whether the Roberts Court was willing to put 
its might where its mouth was on administrative law, even at the cost of destabilizing longstanding 
governance regimes.  Or would its anti-administrativism continue to live mainly at the margins, 
tamping down perceived administrative law excesses without forcing radical changes in 
administrative law doctrines or received wisdom about the structural constitution?  Justice 
Kavanaugh’s track record on the DC Circuit—the nation’s leading administrative law court— 
suggested that he would be amenable to further narrowing and retraction in core administrative 
law doctrines of deference and delegation.19  Moreover, the Court granted certiorari in several 
cases that raised pointed challenges to basic administrative law precepts, suggesting that it was 
finally willing to put its anti-administrativism into action.20 
 
 Yet administrative law’s denouement did not come.  After a term rife with important 
administrative law decisions, established administrative law remains in force, albeit narrowed.  
                                                 
14 Michigan, 135 S Ct at 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring). 
15 138 S Ct at 2120–21 (Kennedy, J, concurring), id at 2129 (Alito, J, dissenting) (both voicing concerns with the 
Court’s treatment of Chevron); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F3d at 1154–56 (Gorsuch, J, concurring) (questioning whether 
Chevron violates separation of powers).  
16 See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, 136 S Ct 2131, 2142 (2016) (applying Chevron deference to validate 
Patent and Trademark Office rules for inter partes review). 
17 See Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 47–48 & n 278 (cited in note 11). 
18 See, for example, Wisconsin Central Ltd v United States, 138 S Ct 2067, 2074 (2018); Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, 
138 S Ct 1612, 1630 (2018); see also Pereira, 138 S Ct at 2121 (Alito, J, dissenting) (“Here, a straightforward 
application of Chevron requires us to accept the Government's construction of the provision at issue. But the Court 
rejects the Government's interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading of the statute. I can only 
conclude that the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron”). 
19 Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers (SCOTUSBlog, July 
26, 2018), archived at https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-and-separation-of-
powers (summarizing Justice Kavanaugh’s DC Circuit opinions on separation of powers and agency deference). 
20 See, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kisor v Wilkie, 18-15, *i (US filed June 29, 2018); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Gundy v United States, 17-6086, *i (US filed Sept 20, 2017). 





Thus, in Kisor v Wilkie,21 the Court did not overturn the Auer doctrine of deference to agency 
regulatory interpretations, although it tempered such deference in significant ways.  Similarly, in 
Department of Commerce v New York,22 the Court ultimately reaffirmed and arguably expanded 
administrative law’s core requirement of reasoned decisionmaking to include a prohibition on 
pretextual explanations of agency decisions.  In several other cases, the Court hewed to existing 
administrative law frameworks.  The case in which the anti-administrativist view gained the most 
traction was Gundy v United States,23 where four justices signaled sympathy for a full-bore assault 
on the constitutionality of broad delegations.  Even so, a plurality upheld the measure in question 
applying the Court’s well-established doctrine on delegation, and as of this writing it remains 
unclear (and in my view unlikely) whether a majority will materialize for a major doctrinal 
recalibration on delegation that would call the constitutionality of the administrative state into 
question. 
 
 The 2018 Term cases demonstrate that the Roberts Court is deeply divided on 
administrative law.  These divisions track clear ideological lines.  Justice Gorsuch emerged as the 
voice of the four more conservative justices this term, intent on overturning established 
administrative law doctrines and pulling back on administrative government.  Meanwhile Justice 
Kagan led the four liberal justices in a defensive effort, seeking to deter or at least mitigate the 
conservative assault.  In the middle was Chief Justice Roberts, sharing the conservatives’ suspicion 
of government and bureaucracy yet resistant to the dramatic disruption and potential institutional 
costs to the Court that Gorsuch’s approach might yield.  The cases, particularly Kisor and 
Department of Commerce, also illuminate several core analytic themes and tensions in the Roberts 
Court’s administrative law jurisprudence. These include recently reemerged philosophical disputes 
over the distinction between law and policy as well as more longstanding constitutional 
disagreements about separation of powers formalism, functionalism, and minimalism.  Another 
central development is an increased historical focus, a development evident in Roberts Court 
administrative law opinions from all quarters.  This increased historicism surfaced notably in 
revived debates over the meaning of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, with originalist and 
textualist interpretation of the APA’s text squaring off against a more evolving, common law 
approach to the statute and administrative law writ large.  Although important, these analytic 
disagreements are unable on their own to explain the direction of Roberts Court administrative 
law.  Among other issues, they map the Court’s ideological divides imperfectly, with some trends 
spanning both camps and inconsistencies on both sides. 
 
Taking a further step back, two contrasting frames emerge from the Roberts Court’s 
administrative law opinions from the 2018 Term, building on these analytic tensions.  The first is 
formalist in the extreme, insisting on sharp demarcations among the branches and between law 
and policy.  It is also insistently originalist, condemning contemporary judicial review doctrines 
as at odds with traditional understandings of the judicial power and the meaning of the APA.  With 
its categorical and uncompromising stance, commitment to limited government and aggressive 
judicial review, this approach has the potential to radically transform American governance.  That 
seems in part the purpose, as this radical frame is accompanied by deep skepticism about 
administrative government. 
                                                 
21 139 S Ct 2400 (2019). 
22 139 S Ct 2551 (2019). 
23 139 S Ct 2116 (2019). 






The second frame encompasses justices with a broader range of views about constitutional 
structure and administrative government.  Most are functionalist and accepting of constitutional 
evolution, but at least the Chief Justice (a sometime adherent) is more formalist and originalist.  
They also disagree on the extent to which administrative government poses a serious problem at 
all, and if it does whether the concern is the potential for arbitrary agency action or a politically 
unaccountable bureaucracy.  But what unites them is that they are unwilling to radically disrupt 
existing governance regimes, at least not all at once. Instead, they share a commitment to 
addressing whatever problems exist with administrative government by gradually fine-tuning 
doctrine. The central characteristic of this approach is therefore its incremental, common law 
character. The impact of this incrementalist approach is harder to discern, given both the variation 
within its ranks and the longer time-horizon needed to assess incremental change. It also leaves 
lower courts greater room to apply administrative law as they see fit, which could yield more 
pullback in administrative law or its continued preservation, depending on the orientations of lower 
court judges. Like its radical cousin, this incrementalist frame could result in a substantial pullback 
in administrative power, but it would have this effect through a more subconstitutional and 
statutory interpretation guise and over a longer period of time.   
 
In assessing the future impact of Roberts Court administrative law, the most important 
factor may be this tension between radicalism and incrementalism.  Which of these analytic frames 
will ultimately prevail still remains an open question, but incrementalism was plainly the victor in 
the 2018 Term’s administrative law decisions.  That is significant, but should also not obscure that 
there was unity across the Court in urging greater judicial scrutiny of administrative action.  
Moreover, despite invocations of the importance of bureaucratic expertise, these decisions share 
the concerns with unaccountable, aggrandized, and arbitrary administrative power that 
characterize the Roberts Court’s administrative jurisprudence more widely.   
 
That administrative power is expansive is indisputable, as is the possibility that such power 
could be abused.  Yet the Roberts Court’s portrayal of administrative government is strikingly 
incomplete.  Notably lacking is reference to the ways that the administrative state operates to 
constrain power, render it accountable, and advance individual liberty. The lack of such an 
affirmative account reinforces the sense that the goal of Roberts Court administrative law may be 
to pull back on government for its own sake, rather than to better achieve constitutional values.  
Absent a more balanced view of the administrative state, the Roberts Court is unlikely to develop 
a coherent approach to administrative law. 
 
Part I of what follows discusses the 2018 Term’s administrative law cases, looking in detail 
at the two decisions addressing judicial review of agency decisionmaking, Kisor v Wilkie and 
Department of Commerce v New York.  Part II then elucidates several key analytic tensions 
underlying these decisions and the Roberts Court’s administrative law jurisprudence writ large, 
while Part III assesses what the 2018 Term decisions portend for the future of administrative law. 
 
 





I.  Administrative Law in the 2018 Term 
 
 Administrative law took center-stage in the 2018 Term.  A range of cases presented the 
Court with opportunities to remake doctrine, opportunities that the Court for the most part 
declined.  In some instances, the Court took a minimalist approach, invoking established doctrine 
to resolve relatively noncontroversial issues and punting the difficult questions back to the lower 
courts.24  In others, the Court engaged more forthrightly with contentious administrative law 
issues, albeit ultimately sidestepping dramatic changes.25   
 
Two administrative law decisions deserve special attention: Kisor v Wilkie and Department 
of Commerce v New York.  Both were prominent cases that centered on the core and much disputed 
issue of judicial deference to administrative determinations.  Both also involved a majority 
affirming the principle of deference as well as existing deference doctrines, and thus they too are 
instances in which the Court avoided dramatic change.  Together, these two cases offer an 
illuminating window on recurring themes and tensions in the Roberts Court’s approach to 
administrative law. 
 
A. Kisor v Wilkie  
 
 Factually, Kisor arose from a veteran’s repeated efforts to get disability benefits from the 
Department of Veteran Affairs.  Jurisprudentially, the background to Kisor lay in a 2011 
concurrence by Justice Scalia, where he criticized the practice of giving deference to agency 
interpretations of their own regulations.26  Known as either Seminole Rock deference (after a 1945 
decision setting out the doctrine27) or more recently as Auer deference (after a 1997 decision 
reaffirming the doctrine28), this doctrine provides that courts should defer to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation” or there is some other “reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect 
the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”29  Despite having authored 
Auer for a unanimous Court fourteen years earlier, Justice Scalia argued in 2011 that “it seems 
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates 
a law to interpret it as well” and expressed concern “that deferring to an agency's interpretation of 
                                                 
24 See Weyerhaeuser Co v Fish & Wildlife Service, 139 S Ct 361, 369, 371–72 (2018) (remanding question of whether 
property requiring some modification to support a species can count as habitat and whether the Secretary had acted 
arbitrarily in assessing the costs and benefits of designing property not currently occupied by frog species as habitat); 
see also PDR Network v Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, 139 S Ct 2051, 2055–56 (2019) (remanding for court of 
appeals to determine whether the FCC order at issue was a legislative or interpretive rule and whether the petitioner 
had a “prior” and “adequate” opportunity to obtain judicial review of the order). 
25 Gundy v United States, 139 S Ct 2116 (2019), is a prime example. There, Justice Kagan, id at 2129–30 (Kagan, J) 
(plurality), and Justice Gorsuch, id at 2133–37, 2143–45 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), battled directly over the 
constitutionality of congressional delegations of policymaking authority to administrative agencies. The radical 
potential of the case lies in the fact that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Gorsuch’s dissent and Justice 
Alito penned a concurrence indicating his willingness to reconsider nondelegation doctrine, id at 2130 (Alito, J, 
concurring in the judgment).But these were, in the end, a dissent and a concurrence, and a majority upheld the specific 
delegation challenged there under the existing intelligible principle test.   
26 Talk America Inc v Michigan Bell Co, 564 US 50, 67–68 (2011) (Scalia, J, concurring). 
27 Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410, 413–14 (1945). 
28 Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997). 
29 Id at 461–62. 





its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future 
adjudications, to do what it pleases.”30  A majority of the Court cited Justice Scalia’s concerns the 
next year in Christopher v SmithKline Beecham Corporation, when it refused to grant Auer 
deference to the Department of Labor’s new interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
regulations, an interpretation DOL had offered in amicus briefs without prior notice to regulated 
parties.31  
 
Justice Scalia reiterated and expanded his criticism of the doctrine in 2013 in Decker v 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, where he picked up two additional votes (Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito) for his call to reconsider Auer deference.32  And in 2015, in Perez v 
Mortgage Bankers Association, Justice Scalia further argued that Auer deference also violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).33  Justice Thomas, now fully on board, wrote an even longer 
opinion arguing that Auer was unconstitutional because it “represents a transfer of judicial power 
to the Executive Branch, and ... amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a 
‘check’ on the political branches.”34 Justice Alito also signaled his sympathy with these views, 
describing them as “offer[ing] substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be 
incorrect.”35  But the focus of Perez was on invalidating, as “contrary to the clear text of the 
[APA],” the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that agencies undertake notice and comment rulemaking 
before significantly changing a definitive interpretation of a rule.36  The Perez majority was content 
to relegate the Auer issue to a footnote, responding simply that “[e]ven in cases where an agency's 
interpretation receives Auer deference, ... it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given 
regulation means what the agency says. Moreover, Auer deference is not an inexorable command 
in all cases.”37  
 
Perez sparked concerted efforts by business groups and conservative organizations to get 
a case seeking to overrule Auer before the Court.38  One such case, involving the Department of 
Education’s interpretation of its rules to require public schools to allow transsexual students to use 
the gender bathroom of their choice, was granted but ultimately dismissed when the Trump 
Administration rescinded the interpretation.39  Finally, however, with Kisor they scored the legal 
vehicle of their dreams.  Kisor involved about as sympathetic a plaintiff one could find: a former 
Marine, still suffering from his service in Vietnam, wrongly denied disability benefits when he 
first applied in 1982 and then subsequently unable to recoup benefits retroactively because the 
agency deemed the new service records he supplied not “relevant” for purposes of a VA regulation 
                                                 
30 Talk America, 564 US at 68 (Scalia, J, concurring). 
31 567 US 142, 159–61 (2012). 
32 568 US 597, 615 (2013) (Scalia, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
33 135 S Ct 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment). 
34 Id at 1217 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment). 
35 Id at 1210 (Alito, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
36 Id at 1206. 
37 Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4. 
38 See Brief amici curiae of the Chamber of Commerce the United States of America, Garco Construction Inc v 
Secretary of the Army, No 17-225, *2–3 (US filed on Sept 11, 2017) (cert denied) (requesting the Court to reconsider 
Auer); Brief amici curiae of American Action Forum et al, United States Aid Inc v Bible, No 15-861, *3 (US filed Feb 
3, 2016), (cert denied) (calling for the overruling of Auer); Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute et al, Gloucester County 
School Board v GG, No 16-273, *4 (US filed Sept 27, 2016) (case resolved on other grounds) (taking no position on 
the merits but urging the Court to overrule Auer). 
39 Gloucester County School Board v GG, 137 S Ct 1239 (2017) (mem). 





governing when the agency could reconsider an earlier benefits denial.40  Moreover, the Court 
granted certiorari solely on the question of whether Auer deference should be overruled.41  The 
general consensus from both Auer’s critics and its defenders was that the Court was poised to 
overrule the doctrine.42 
 
But that didn’t happen.  Instead, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, declined to overrule Auer.  Justice 
Kagan’s majority opinion defending Auer deference was joined in full by the three other liberal 
justices, but Chief Justice Roberts—who provided the crucial fifth vote—joined only in part.  
Meanwhile Justice Gorsuch, concurring only in the judgment and joined by the three other 
conservative justices, assumed the role of Auer’s prime attacker, complaining that “[i]t should have 
been easy for the Court to say goodbye to Auer.”43  Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, 
also wrote separately. 
 
1.  Justice Kagan and the Limits on Auer Deference.  At first glance, Justice Kagan’s 
opinion has a slightly schizophrenic air.  She led with Auer’s virtues, emphasizing several reasons 
why it makes sense to presume that that Congress, having delegated power to an agency to 
implement a statute through rulemaking, would also intend to delegate power to resolve 
ambiguities in those rules.  “In part, that is because the agency that promulgated a rule is in the 
‘better position to reconstruct’ its original meaning”44; in part, it is because agencies are more 
expert and politically accountable than courts; and in part, it is because deferring to agency 
interpretations yields greater uniformity and consistency in interpretations than having courts 
exercising independent judgment.45  But her most central point—what Kagan termed “the core 
theory of Auer deference”46—was that “sometimes the law runs out and policy-laden choice is 
what is left over.”47 And “Congress ... is attuned to the comparative advantages of agencies over 
courts in making such policy judgments.”48  Moreover, she emphasized that ambiguity in 
regulations is inevitable; although at times the result of “careless drafting,” ambiguity often instead 
“reflects the well-known limits of expression or knowledge.”49 
 
                                                 
40 38 CFR § 3.156(c)(1). 
41 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2408–09. 
42 See, for example, Gillian Metzger, The Puzzling and Troubling Grant in Kisor (SCOTUSblog, Jan 30, 2019), 
archived at https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/symposium-the-puzzling-and-troubling-grant-in-
kisor/ (describing the grant in Kisor as part of a conservative effort to overrule Auer and “troubling for what the case 
may portend about how the Roberts Court, with its newly cemented conservative majority, views the administrative 
state”); Kimberly Hermann, The Supreme Court and the Forgotten “Three Ring Government,” (SCOTUSblog, Jan 
29, 2019), archived at https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/symposium-the-supreme-court-and-the-
forgotten-three-ring-government/ (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether it 
should overrule Auer and Seminole Rock” and that “[a] number of Supreme Court opinions . . . suggest that the court 
will answer that question with a ‘yes’”). 
43 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment). 
44 Id at 2412 (plurality) (quoting Martin v Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 US 144, 152 (1991) 
(internal additions omitted)). 
45 Id at 2410–14 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
46 Id at 2415 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
47 Kisor, 239 S Ct at 2415 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
48 Id at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
49 Id at 2410 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 





Justice Kagan then ended her opinion by rebutting at length the many attacks made against 
Auer deference.  One such attack, raised by Kisor and by Justice Gorsuch in dissent, was that 
judicial deference to agency regulatory interpretations violates §706 of the APA, which provides 
that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law ... and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”50  Kagan argued that courts comply with §706 
even when they grant Auer deference, both because they apply extensive independent review 
before deciding to defer and because courts are determining the meaning of a rule by deferring 
when they conclude that Congress delegated authority to interpret the rule to the agency which 
promulgated it.51  She further defended Auer’s constitutionality by insisting that courts still “retain 
a firm grip on the interpretive function,” agencies exercise executive power rather than judicial 
power when they interpret, and the combination of legislative, judicial and executive functions in 
agencies had long been upheld.52  She also dismissed the claim that Auer deference create poor 
agency incentives “to issue vague and open-ended regulations,” maintaining that it “does not 
survive an encounter with reality.” 53  Finally, Kagan argued strongly for retaining Auer deference 
on stare decisis grounds.54   
 
In between these powerful defenses of Auer deference, however, Justice Kagan elaborated 
a multitude of limits that significantly constrain when Auer deference applies. First, Auer deference 
is only triggered in cases of “genuine[e] ambigu[ity],” which means not just surface ambiguity but 
the type of ambiguity that remains after a court has rigorously applied the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation.  In addition, the agency must offer a reasonable interpretation, the  
interpretation must be one that represents the agency’s “authoritative” view, “implicates its 
substantive  expertise,” reflects the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and does not “create 
unfair surprise to regulated parties.”55  This long list closely parallels the “significant limits” on 
Auer deference that the Solicitor General advocated in his Kisor brief.56 And it led Justice Gorsuch 
in concurring in the judgment to chastise the majority for retaining Auer deference only in a 
“maimed,” “enfeebled,” and “zombified” form.57  That may go too far, but Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kavanaugh (the latter joined by Justice Alito) have a point in claiming that the distance 
between Justice Kagan’s opinion retaining Auer and Justice Gorsuch’s dispensing with it “is not 
as great as it may initially appear.”58  Certainly that was true in the case at hand, for Kagan 
ultimately concluded that  lower court “jumped the gun in declaring the [VA’s] regulation 
ambiguous” and suggested that the non-precedential agency interpretation at issue—one of 80,000 
issued by 100 judges sitting singly each year—might well not be the type of considered, 
authoritative interpretation needed for Auer deference to apply.   
                                                 
50 5 USC § 706. 
51 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2419–20 (Kagan, J) (plurality). She further insisted that deference does not give an interpretive 
rule the binding effect that the APA limits to legislative rules for which § 553 demands notice and comment 
procedures, emphasizing again the independent review that courts undertake before deciding to defer and the 
restriction of Auer deference to “an agency’s authoritative and considered judgments” served § 553 values.  Id at 
2420–21 (Kagan, J) (plurality).  
52 Id at 2421–22 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
53 Id at 2421 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (noting not only the lack of empirical evidence to support this claim, but also that 
agencies have all sorts of practical incentives to be clear). 
54 Id at 2422 (Kagan, J) (plurality). 
55 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414–18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
56 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Kisor v Wilkie, No 18-15, *12 (US filed Feb 25, 2019). 
57 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment). 
58 Id at 2424 (Roberts, CJ, concurring in part); see also id at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J, concurring in the judgment). 






A reader is left wondering whether Auer deference is really as beneficial as Justice Kagan 
makes it out to be—and if it is, why on earth the majority doesn’t let it have broader sway.  One 
obvious explanation for this tension in Justice Kagan’s opinion is Chief Justice Roberts. He 
concurred only in the parts of Kagan’s opinion setting out Auer’s limits, arguing that Auer 
deference should be retained on stare decisis grounds, and reversing for reconsideration of whether 
Auer deference should be applied here.  Put differently, only four justices were willing to state that 
Auer deference yields benefits or conforms to Congress’s expectations and the APA. Why Roberts 
was unwilling to join more of Kagan’s opinion is difficult to explain, given that he had previously 
argued that the courts’ law declaring role under the Constitution and the APA can be compatible 
with deference to agency legal interpretations.59  But in light of his stance, the limits Kisor imposed 
on Auer deference appear the necessary price to have Auer retained by a majority at all. 
 
Although the need to secure Roberts’s vote no doubt played an important role in shaping 
the majority opinion, it would be a mistake to view Kagan’s cabining of Auer as simply strategic.  
To begin with, Kagan herself offered a different account, arguing that the limits are prerequisites 
for securing the benefits of Auer deference, not impediments to that goal.  As she put it, the 
presumption that Congress would want a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation would not be 
justified absent ambiguity or “when a court concludes that an interpretation does not reflect an 
agency’s authoritative, expertise-based, fair or considered judgment.”60 In addition, Kagan 
contended that these limits were ones that the Court had already recognized in its prior Auer 
jurisprudence.  Moreover, as a legal academic Justice Kagan had argued strongly in favor of 
limiting deference to interpretations meaningfully reviewed and personally offered by the agency 
official to whom Congress had delegated authority over the relevant administrative action.61  
Kagan wrote there about Chevron deference, but there is an obvious linkage to her argument here 
that Auer deference should be limited to “authoritative” and “considered” agency regulatory 
interpretations. Indeed, in many ways Kisor represents the importation of Chevron/Mead analysis 
into the Auer context:  The Kisor limits add a Mead Step Zero, identifying certain contexts in 
which Auer deference is not even potentially available, and also a rigorous Chevron Step One 
inquiry, in which a court must determine if sufficient ambiguity exists to trigger Auer deference.62  
 
These defenses of Kisor’s limits are only partially successful. It is true that the Court 
already had “cabined Auer’s scope in varied and critical ways,” 63 but the Court certainly expanded 
on these limits in Kisor.  More importantly, Kagan papered over the evident tensions between the 
limits she articulated and the justifications she offered for Auer deference. Take, for example, 
                                                 
59 See City of Arlington, 569 US at 316–17 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (arguing that deference is compatible with the 
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60 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (internal additions and citations omitted). 
61 David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S Ct Rev 201, 235, 238–39 (2001). 
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(outlining the Chevron/Mead framework and describing the multiple factors Mead identified as relevant in 
determining if deference applies); see also Kristin E. Hickman and Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 
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filed Mar 4, 2019). 





Kagan’s argument that agencies are more expert and politically accountable than courts, and thus 
Congress would likely consider agencies better positioned to make the policy judgments that 
resolving regulatory ambiguity requires.64 Surely this institutional competency argument for 
deference also extends to instances in which agencies change their interpretations, even at the cost 
of unfair surprise, provided agencies provide a reasoned explanation for the change.  Yet Kagan 
rejected deference in such circumstances.  And while a good case can be made that Congress would 
not intend deference when the text of a rule is clear, it is hardly obvious that Congress would want 
courts to work hard to resolve seeming ambiguities on their own, rather than to defer to agencies 
once some ambiguity becomes apparent.  After all, agencies’ greater expertise and knowledge of 
the rule likely makes them better positioned to determine when ambiguity actually exists, as well 
as to resolve that ambiguity once identified.  Kagan also downplays the costs that Auer’s limits 
may carry, in particular the way that a more case-by-case assessment of relevant factors increases 
uncertainty for regulated parties and agencies alike.  Gorsuch underscored this point,65 and it is 
one that Kagan had previously acknowledged,66 yet she largely ignored it here. 
 
This is not to say that the limits Justice Kagan imposed on Auer deference are indefensible, 
but rather that their underlying rationale does not and cannot lie solely in congressional intent.  
Instead, these limits stem from normative and functional concerns—in particular, fairness to 
regulated parties, the need for a check on agency power, ensuring expert decisionmaking, and 
encouraging political accountability.  In her past life as an academic, Kagan was open about how 
deference doctrines “arise from and reflect candid policy judgments ... about the allocation of 
interpretive authority.”67  But in Kisor she avoided forthright engagement with the conflicting 
concerns at work in constructing deference doctrines.  Take again the example of changed agency 
interpretations:  Such interpretations often reflect transformations in administrative policy 
stemming from change in political control of the executive branch, yet they risk undercutting 
legitimate reliance. In Kisor, Justice Kagan plainly prioritized reliance over electoral 
accountability, but we are left to wonder why.68  
 
2.  Justice Gorsuch’s Contrasting Vision.  Justice Gorsuch provided a very different take 
on Auer deference, recounting in detail what had become the standard litany of Auer’s sins.  He 
maintained that Auer deference was a historical aberration plainly at odds with the APA’s judicial 
review and procedural requirements.  In his view, §706’s “unqualified command requires the court 
to determine legal questions—including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its own 
lights.”  Hence, a “court that, in deference to an agency, adopts something other than the best 
reading of a regulation ... is abdicating the duty Congress assigned to it.”69  And Auer “effectively 
nullifies the distinction” Congress drew between notice-and-comment rules that carry the force of 
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law and interpretive rules that do not.70  In the face of such “clear statutory commands,” he argued 
it made no sense to presume that Congress “really, secretly, wanted courts to treat agency 
interpretations as binding.”71 He argued equally forcefully that Auer violates Article III and the 
separation of powers “by coopt[ing] the judicial power,” and uniting “the powers of making, 
enforcing and interpreting the laws ... in the same hands,” thereby compromising “a cornerstone 
of the rule of law.”72  Underlying these statutory and constitutional arguments was Gorsuch’s 
rejection of Kagan’s equation of law and policy.  Such an equation “contradicts a basic premise of 
our legal order:  that we are governed not by the shifting whims of politicians and bureaucrats, but 
by written laws whose meaning is fixed and ascertainable.”73  Left out of this portrayal is the 
possibility that the alternative to agency deference might actually be governance by the shifting 
whims of life-tenured federal judges, as they struggle to give meaning to complicated and 
indeterminate laws. 
 
A particularly notable contrast lies in the two opinions’ views of agencies.  For Justice 
Kagan, agencies are expert bodies assigned public responsibilities by Congress and inevitably 
confronted with regulatory ambiguity.74 For Justice Gorsuch, they are biased actors who are no 
different than self-interested private parties and will exploit ambiguity to their own advantage.75  
For Kagan, agencies’ political aspect is a positive feature, helping to ensure that the administrative 
state remains accountable; for Gorsuch, it means that Auer deference threatens the constitutional 
structure by elevating “raw political executive power” over the Constitution’s promise of an 
independent and impartial judiciary.76  These divergent views suggest very different 
understandings of the administrative state. Implicit in Kagan’s opinion is a positive account of 
administrative government and the benefits of expert and accountable regulation; the image she 
repeatedly referred to was of the FDA and its expertise when it comes to identifying active 
moieties.77  Justice Gorsuch explicitly articulates a darker vision, one under which the “explosive 
growth of the administrative state [and regulations] over the last half-century” means that the 
“mischief” and “cost” of Auer deference has “increased dramatically.”78 
 
In addition, where Justice Kagan’s defense of Auer is qualified and cabined, Justice 
Gorsuch’s attack on the doctrine is uncompromising and absolute. Yet at times Gorsuch’s 
arguments seem overdone.  From his opinion it is hard to understand how the Court could ever 
have been so benighted to adopt Auer deference in the first place, let alone adhere to it for decades 
and preserve it for the future.  Or take Gorsuch’s attack on “the majority’s attempt to remodel 
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72 Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2439–40 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted). 
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Auer’s rule into a multi-step, multifactor inquiry [that] guarantees more uncertainty and much 
litigation.”79  Although the uncertainty generated by Kisor is a valid point, Gorsuch insisted in the 
same breath that the better approach would be to apply the notoriously fuzzy doctrine of Skidmore 
deference—under which the weight given an agency’s interpretation of a regulation would depend 
on the factors that give it “power to persuade.”80 On a clarity and certainty scale, Kisor’s 
domesticated version of Auer and Skidmore deference are hardly worlds apart.  
   
Ultimately, Gorsuch insisted that Kisor’s affirmance of Auer is “more a stay of execution 
than a pardon,” all but inviting future challenges until the Court “find[s] the nerve ... [to] inter Auer 
at last.”81  By thus vowing continued resistance, Gorsuch may have done more to guarantee 
ongoing uncertainty and dispute than the majority’s new limits did.  And with the disruptive stakes 
of efforts to overturn Auer thus clarified, it is not surprising that stare decisis became the decisive 
issue in the case. 
 
3.  Stare Decisis, Auer Deference, and Chevron.  Kisor was one of many cases in the 2018 
Term in which stare decisis emerged as a central point of contention among the justices.82  What 
made Kisor unusual is that stare decisis concerns carried the day here—and even more, did so over 
the contention that stare decisis was categorically inapplicable to deference doctrines. 
 
Both Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch offered standard stare decisis claims.  Kagan’s 
main stare decisis argument was the disruption that overruling Auer deference would cause, given 
that the doctrine represents a “long line of precedents ... going back 75 years or more” and 
“pervades the whole corpus of administrative law. ... It is the rare overruling that introduces so 
much instability into so many areas of law, all in one blow.”83  Kagan’s argument on this score 
was helped by the fact that both Kisor’s attorney and the Solicitor General had acknowledged that 
overturning Auer would open up many precedents to reconsideration.84 She also emphasized that 
Congress was free to overrule Auer but had not done so, suggesting that Auer deference should 
enjoy the same high level of stare decisis accorded statutory constructions.85 Gorsuch, for his part, 
drew on a litany of established grounds for rejecting stare decisis, insisting that Auer deference 
was accidental, never justified, unworkable, at odds with norms of legal interpretation, and not a 
doctrine on which private parties had relied.86 
 
But their main bone of contention centered on how Auer deference should be viewed.  
Justice Kagan framed Auer deference as a substantive doctrine and inseparable (at least 
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categorically) from the results reached in specific cases where it is applied.87  Justice Gorsuch did 
not seriously dispute the disruptive impact of overruling Auer if viewed in substantive terms.  But 
he rejected this framing, arguing that the better analogy is to see Auer as an interpretive 
methodology, like the “proper weight to afford to historical practice in constitutional cases or 
legislative history in statutory cases,” which the Court does not regard as “binding future Justices 
with the full force of horizontal stare decisis.”88 Gorsuch based this claim on the fact that Auer 
does not “purport to settle the meaning of a single statute or resolve a particular case” but instead 
claims “to prescribe an interpretive methodology governing every future dispute.”89 
 
Neither Justice Kagan’s nor Justice Gorsuch’s arguments on this front are fully satisfying.  
As Randy Kozel has maintained, deference doctrines fall somewhere in-between decisions 
addressing specific substantive interpretations and interpretive methodologies.90  It is analytically 
possible, if smacking of ipse dixit, to overrule Auer while still according stare decisis effect to 
specific decisions reached in reliance on Auer.  In addition, Gorsuch has a point in arguing that 
Auer’s breadth of application means that applying stare decisis here has a greater constraining 
effect on judges than granting stare decisis to specific interpretations.91  On the other hand, 
Gorsuch’s further suggestion that congressional efforts to tell courts how to review agency 
interpretations may unconstitutionally intrude on judicial independence is a more radical 
proposition than he acknowledged and unsupported by current case law.92  It would call much of 
§706 of the APA into question, for example, as that provision consists entirely of congressional 
instructions to courts on how to review agency action.93   
 
On the whole, Kagan’s identification of Auer as a substantive doctrine is more persuasive 
than Gorsuch’s effort to analogize it to a method of interpretation.  To begin with, Gorsuch’s effort 
to equate Auer with an interpretive methodology is hard to square with the Court’s practice of 
treating deference doctrines as mandatory. Prior to the current attack on Auer and Chevron, the 
Court did not debate whether or not those frameworks governed its review of agency regulatory 
and statutory interpretations; instead, the justices’ disagreements centered on questions internal to 
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those frameworks, such as whether the relevant regulatory or statutory texts were ambiguous.94  
And while vertical stare decisis raises issues about the Supreme Court’s superintendence of lower 
federal courts that are absent from horizontal stare decisis, it merits note that the Court does not 
portray deference doctrines as optional for lower courts to follow.  To the contrary, the Court has 
reversed lower courts for mistakes in their application these frameworks.95  Of course, that an 
approach represents the Court’s current practice does not immunize it from criticism and change, 
but current practice should carry particular weight in stare decisis assessments. 
 
In addition, Gorsuch’s suggestion that transsubstantive doctrines should not trigger stare 
decisis would have a dramatic impact on administrative law.  Administrative law is 
transsubstantive to its core.  Although many of its transsubstantive doctrines are ultimately rooted 
in the APA or another statute, they frequently represent substantial judicial development from that 
statutory basis.96  As a result, rejecting stare decisis for transsubstantive doctrines could open up 
the field to fundamental transformation.  That links Gorsuch’s rejection of stare decisis to the rest 
of his opinion and its broad invocation of constitutional first principles to oppose Auer deference. 
It also supports Kagan’s insistence that rejection of Auer deference would be profoundly 
disruptive; the arguments for overturning Auer are not easily cabined to the context of agency 
regulatory interpretations but would extend to other deference contexts and other instances in 
which agencies combine legislative, executive, and adjudicatory functions.  
 
 The potential implications of Kisor for other administrative law doctrines was driven home 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, both of whom insisted in their concurrences that 
the decision in Kisor did not resolve the propriety of Chevron deference to agency statutory 
interpretations.97  These statements are puzzling. Stare decisis should be at least as much of a 
concern for Chevron deference, if not more so, given Chevron’s greater centrality to administrative 
law.98 Moreover, it is hard to see why the formalist argument that granting agencies interpretive 
power unconstitutionally intrudes on the judicial power would be any different between Auer and 
Chevron.  Indeed, Justice Thomas and then-Judge Gorsuch have penned opinions castigating 
Chevron deference in exactly the same terms.99 Given that this argument failed to obtain majority 
support in Kisor, logically it should also fail to get majority support in a case addressing Chevron. 
Further reinforcing the parallels between the two deference doctrines, the Court already has 
curtailed Chevron deference in ways similar to the limits imposed on Auer deference in Kisor, 
such as requiring more evidence that an interpretation is authorized and more judicial probing 
before concluding ambiguity exists.100   
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Perhaps Roberts and Kavanaugh simply did not want to be read as answering the question 
of Chevron’s status in a case addressing Auer, but were not signaling they would reach a different 
result.  Alternatively, they may have wanted to preserve room to pullback further on Chevron’s 
across-the-board presumption of implied congressional delegation of authority to agencies to fill 
gaps and resolve ambiguities in the statutes they administer. This would fit their prior 
jurisprudence; in particular, Roberts has argued that questions addressing jurisdiction or matters 
of “deep economic and political significance” should not receive Chevron deference, and 
Kavanaugh has rejected Chevron deference for agency authority to issue major rules.101 If so, they 
might continue to support Chevron deference to agency interpretations when expressly authorized 
by Congress or when they view statutory terms as plainly granting deference.  Another possible 
reason for their statements is that, unlike Auer, Chevron deference grants an agency interpretive 
authority over Congress’s handiwork and not the agency’s own regulations.  Although Justice 
Scalia viewed this feature as making Auer deference more suspect because it allowed agencies to 
self-delegate power,102 one could argue that the opposite is true.  On this view, Chevron is the 
greater threat to the constitutional order because it elevates agencies over Congress and in the 
process removes statutes as critical external checks on agencies’ claims to power.  If adopted, this 
argument would most strongly call Chevron deference into question, but for that reason it is hardest 
to square with both justices’ willingness to grant Chevron deference in the past. 
 
 
B.  Department of Commerce v New York 
 
Judicial deference to agency decisionmaking was also at the heart of Department of 
Commerce.  But that was where the parallels between these two cases ended.  Department of 
Commerce lacked a Supreme Court jurisprudential lead up akin to that in Kisor.   Similarly lacking 
were calls for a fundamental reconsideration of existing doctrine; to the contrary, the different 
opinions in Department of Commerce sought to outdo each other with their adherence to governing 
frameworks.  Most striking, however, was the changed position of the different justices, with the 
justices who urged overturning Auer here arguing for substantial deference to agency policy 
choices, and those who defended Auer here advocating subjecting agency decisionmaking to 
greater scrutiny. 
 
At issue in Department of Commerce was Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s decision in 
March 2018 to add a question about citizenship to the 2020 census.  Doing so went against the 
strong advice of the Census Bureau in the Department of Commerce.  Ever since 1950, the Bureau 
has argued against adding a citizenship question to the census form that went to most households, 
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out of concern that the question would lower response rates and generate false claims of citizenship 
that would undercut the census’s accuracy.  Moreover, Bureau officials maintain that better 
citizenship data was available from other administrative records, including the American 
Community Survey, which the Bureau sends every year to a small percentage of U.S. households 
on a rotating basis.103  Ross ultimately opted for an approach that would include a citizenship 
question on the census as well as draw on administrative records.  In explaining his decision to 
add the question—and in testifying to Congress—Ross repeatedly emphasized that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) needed census-block citizenship data to enforce the Voting Rights Act and had 
submitted a letter asking for the question’s inclusion.104   
 
Litigation immediately followed, with two of the lawsuits being consolidated in federal 
district court in New York City.  The case was unusual from the start.  It quickly became evident 
that the initial administrative record submitted to the court was, to put it kindly, sparse.  On its 
own initiative, the Government supplemented the record with a brief memo from Ross indicating 
not only that Ross had sought to include a citizenship question well before DOJ’s request, but also 
that DOJ had only made the request at Commerce’s prodding.  These revelations caused the district 
court to order the Government to complete the administrative record, which led to over 12,000 
pages of new material being added.105 In addition, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion 
for extra-record discovery and depositions, including of Secretary Ross, after concluding that the 
new record material strongly suggested that the plaintiffs would find evidence showing that Ross 
acted in bad faith.106  These discovery disputes were the basis for the case’s first appearance at the 
Supreme Court in October 2018, where the Court stayed Ross’s deposition but let the rest of the 
extra-record development go forward, over a dissent by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas.107  The 
district court proceeded to issue a mammoth 178-page opinion just three months later, enjoining 
addition of the citizenship question on the grounds that Secretary Ross’s decision violated the 
Census Act and was arbitrary and capricious, and further that the Secretary’s explanation for why 
he had added the question was pretextual.108  The Supreme Court immediately jumped back in, 
taking the uncommon step of granting the Government’s request for certiorari before the court of 
appeals heard the case and making the case a late addition to the 2018 Term.109   
 
Much of this speed and early Supreme Court involvement can be put down to fast 
approaching deadlines for printing the census, but also reflected the case’s high-profile status and 
clear political ramifications.  The states and localities challenging the decision to add a citizenship 
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question were blue jurisdictions with substantial noncitizen populations that stood to lose 
representation and funds from undercounting minorities.  Those supporting the administration 
were red jurisdictions that would gain from an undercount elsewhere.110  In addition, adding the 
citizenship question echoed strongly with the Trump Administration’s harsh stance on unlawful 
immigration and with Republican efforts to draw electoral districts based on citizenship voting age 
population—a move that a leading Republican redistricting strategist described as “advantageous 
to Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites” and argued “would clearly be a disadvantage for the 
Democrats.”111 Fittingly, the drama surrounding the case reached an even greater pitch once it was 
revealed after oral argument that this same strategist had urged Ross to add the question and 
ghostwritten the DOJ letter.  That the strategist’s involvement emerged only because his estranged 
daughter happened to find the documents in his files after his death was just icing on the cake.112 
 
1.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Split Opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts was again the pivotal vote 
in the case but here wrote the majority opinion.  Like Kagan’s opinion in Kisor, Roberts’s majority 
opinion has a split personality.  Roberts was joined by four justices—Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and 
Kavanaugh—in concluding that Secretary Ross’s decision to add the question was not arbitrary 
and capricious and did not violate the Census Act.  And he was also joined by four justices, but a 
different four—Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—in concluding that the decision 
nonetheless had to be remanded because the explanation Ross provided was pretextual.113   
 
The split character of Roberts’s opinion shows even more in his tone and reasoning.  Most 
of the opinion treated Ross’s decision as a perfectly reasonable and historically-grounded policy 
choice.  Roberts began with a brief description of the role and history of the census, emphasizing 
that “[e]very census between 1820 and 2000 (with the exception of 1840) asked at least some of 
the population about their citizenship or place of birth.”114  Roberts proceeded to give Secretary 
Ross every possible benefit of the doubt and then some.  For example, where the district court and 
Justice Breyer’s partial dissent criticized Ross for failing to take into account the Census Bureau’s 
assessment that adding a citizenship question would harm the accuracy of the census, Roberts 
underscored uncertainties in the Bureau’s analysis.  Roberts even went so far as to suggest that it 
was “inconclusive” whether adding the question would depress census response rates at all, despite 
the Census Bureau’s own conclusions to the contrary.  This framing allowed Roberts to portray 
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Ross’s decision as a paradigmatic example of the type of “value-laden decisionmaking and the 
weighing of incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty” to which courts owe deference.115  
Not only was “the choice between reasonable policy alternatives in the face of uncertainly ... the 
Secretary’s to make,” but also Ross’s choice was “reasonable and reasonably explained, 
particularly in light of the long history of the citizenship question on the census.”116 
 
Then in the final Part V of his opinion, Roberts dramatically changed his tune.  Here 
Roberts took the evidentiary record at face value and rejected the government’s entreaties to 
exclude the extra-record material, concluding that ultimately the district court was justified in 
adding it.  Far from being reasonable decisionmaker in the face of uncertainty, Ross was now 
portrayed as having a closed mind from the get-go: “Th[e] evidence showed that the Secretary was 
determined to reinstate a citizenship question from the time he entered office ... [and] instructed 
his staff to make it happen.”117 Worse, that evidence showed that Ross’s “VRA enforcement 
rationale—the sole stated reason [for adding the citizenship question]—seems to have been 
contrived,”118 was “incongruent with ... the record,”119 and simply “a distraction.”120  Or, put with 
less finesse, the record showed that Ross had lied.  By definition, that meant he had acted 
unreasonably, for “[a]ccepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose” of courts requiring 
agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their actions.121   
 
Roberts’s invalidation of Ross’s decision as pretextual stands in sharp contrast to his 
majority opinion just a year before in Trump v Hawaii.122 There, Roberts wrote for a 5-4 Court 
sustaining a ban on travel to the United States from a number of countries, almost all of which 
were majority-Muslim, despite substantial evidence suggesting the ban was animated by anti-
Muslim bias. This evidence included the proverbial smoking gun—numerous statements by 
President Trump and his advisors demonstrating such bias and arguing for a Muslim ban or 
identifying the travel ban as a Muslim ban—as well as a process used in issuing the initial version 
of the ban that deviated substantially from usual practice.123 Yet other than recounting this history, 
Roberts limited his analysis to the face of the ban and the process used to produce the version of 
the ban that was before the Court.124  In Hawaii, Roberts emphasized that the travel ban implicated 
national security matters over which courts owed the President particular deference, and the 
absence of such matters in Department of Commerce may help explain his greater scrutiny here.  
Yet as both Justices Thomas and Alito argued, the census is also a context in which the executive 
branch enjoys substantial discretion, but that did not preclude Roberts from invalidating on pretext 
grounds. 
 
On the other hand, the split character of Roberts’s opinion in Department of Commerce 
brings to mind another Roberts opinion, the one he wrote in 2012 in NFIB v Sebelius.  There, too, 
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Roberts alternated between his conservative and liberal colleagues, agreeing with the former that 
the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) fell outside the constitutional scope of 
Congress’s commerce or necessary and proper powers but joining with the latter to hold that the 
ACA nonetheless was a constitutional tax.125  And the same institutional legitimacy concerns that 
motivated Roberts in NFIB126 appear to have played a role here, as signaled by Roberts’s statement 
that the Court did not have to “exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free” in 
concluding that Ross’s claimed rationale of wanting to support VRA enforcement was 
pretextual.127  To sanction Ross’s decision in the face of such evident deception and partisanship 
risked the Court being viewed as simply a political institution, much the way invalidating the signal 
Democratic political achievement in a generation might have done.128  Reports that Roberts 
changed his stance on pretext after oral argument, while the drama surrounding the case was 
growing outside the Court, adds support to the conclusion that institutional legitimacy concerns 
animated his position.129   
 
Yet this legitimacy account does not really explain the split character of Roberts’s opinion.  
Why risk having the Court appear political by defending the Trump Administration’s decision to 
add a citizenship question, only to conclude that this decision was pretextual and therefore invalid?  
If Roberts’s goal was to give each side something to mute criticism of the Court, he was no more 
successful here than in NFIB; in both cases his opinions sparked strong partial dissents and critical 
public response.130  An alternative explanation for Roberts’s split opinion is that he believed the 
pretextual problem with Ross’s decision was curable.  This explanation fits with Roberts’s decision 
to remand and his emphasis that the Court was “not hold[ing] that the agency decision here was 
substantively invalid.”131  But it is harder to square with Roberts’s conclusion that the only reason 
Ross had offered for adding the question—enhanced VRA enforcement—was not an actual reason 
for his decision.  That conclusion, pivotal to Roberts’s determination that Ross’s explanation was 
pretextual, made it very hard to see how the pretext problem could be cured without undertaking 
an entirely new decisionmaking process.132  But the Solicitor General had long maintained that the 
census form had to be finalized by the end of June to meet the deadlines for conducting the census 
in 2020, which would not allow leeway for anything more than a pro forma stamp on remand.133  
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Not only would such a pro forma approach fail to cure the pretext the Court had identified, but 
upholding such a pro forma process after remand would make the Court look worse than if it had 
just upheld the decision initially.  As a result, the pretext ruling meant the end of the Trump 
Administration’s effort to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census, as DOJ attorneys soon 
concluded and ultimately so did the Attorney General and the President. 
 
2.  The Administrative Record, Pretext, and Arbitrary and Capriciousness Review. 
Reflecting the split nature of Roberts’s opinion, there were strong partial dissents from the other 
justices on each side, as well from Justice Alito who argued that judicial review was inappropriate 
because the content of the census was “committed to agency discretion by law.”134  Put together, 
the Department of Commerce opinions represent an administrative law smorgasbord, addressing a 
range of difficult questions concerning pretext in administrative contexts, the nature of the 
administrative record, the scope of arbitrary and capriciousness review, and the proper balance of 
politics and expertise in administrative contexts.  Yet, strikingly, none of the opinions 
acknowledged the difficulty of the issues addressed and instead treated the answers they gave as 
dictated by existing precedent and indisputable. 
 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, condemned the Court’s 
invalidation of Ross’s decision on pretext grounds as “unprecedented” and a dangerous “departure 
from our deferential review of discretionary agency decisions.”135  He insisted that pretext was 
simply not a relevant inquiry under arbitrary and capriciousness review and that the record did not 
establish pretext in any event.  Thomas also chastised the Court for “proceeding beyond the 
administrative record,” warning that the effect of doing so was to provide a new “avenue of attack” 
for opponents of executive branch actions, which would “allow partisans to use the courts to 
harangue executive officers through depositions, discovery, delay, and distraction.”136   
 
Thomas’s concerns about courts going outside the record resonate in existing case law.  A 
venerable line of administrative law jurisprudence emphasizes that “the focal point of judicial 
review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made 
initially in the reviewing court.”137 After initially allowing court supplementation in instances 
when more formal findings were lacking, the Court quickly moved to the view that when a 
reviewing court considers the agency record to be inadequate in some way, “the proper course, 
except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation of 
explanation.”138 Thomas’s sudden solicitude for effective governance is surprising, given the 
extent to which he has dismissed similar functionality concerns in his recent administrative law 
opinions.139  Still, his point on this score is well-taken.  In an era in which litigation is the prime 
means by which partisans on both sides seek to derail executive branch actions they oppose, 
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allowing extra-record supplementation risks further hampering of effective government 
administration.  
 
Yet the issue of the district court’s extra-record supplementation was largely a sideshow 
here. Neither the discovery or depositions that the district court ordered in Department of 
Commerce ended up mattering all that much.140  Instead, what was pivotal was the material the 
Government supplied to complete the administrative record per a stipulation with the plaintiffs.  
The district court found that this material alone demonstrated that Ross’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and pretextual.141  Although Roberts invoked the wider universe of both completed-
record and extra-record material, he too emphasized that the completed-record material on its own 
created the “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” sufficient to justify extra-record 
supplementation under the Court’s restrictive precedents.142   
 
Notably, neither Roberts’s majority opinion or Thomas’s partial dissent addresses the 
question of what should be included in the administrative record in the first place.  The proper 
answer to this question is not clear in informal proceedings such as the decisionmaking here, where 
agencies are not limited to considering materials in a formal record.143 The APA states that judicial 
review should be undertaken based on the “whole record” without defining what counts as the 
record:  Is it the record provided to the court, the record that the agency considered or relied upon 
in making its decision, or the record of all the material before the agency?  Lower courts take 
different approaches to this question.144  Moreover, practical and functional concerns point in 
different directions.  Limiting judicial review to the record provided to a court or that the agency 
relied on risks giving agencies incentives to include and consider only materials supporting their 
decisions, but including all the material before the agency or all the material the agency considered 
risks producing a massive record that is highly burdensome to generate, overwhelms courts, and 
obscures the main bases of the agency’s decisionmaking.145  Roberts avoided this issue by relying 
on the fact that the government had not challenged the district court’s conclusion that the 
administrative record was incomplete and stipulated to the addition of substantial new material.146 
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Yet the result in Department of Commerce may make the government less willing to do so in the 
future. 
 
Justice Thomas’s insistence that pretext inquiries are strangers to administrative law is also 
only partially correct.  It’s true that arbitrary and capriciousness review does not usually speak in 
terms of pretext and the Supreme Court had not previously held agency action arbitrary and 
capricious on pretext grounds.147  But Thomas downplays the way that arbitrary and capriciousness 
review serves to identify pretextual decisionmaking without calling it such.  Take, for instance, 
Motor Vehicle Association v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the case that set out the 
modern arbitrary and capriciousness standard.  There, the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration had justified rescinding its automotive passive restraint rule entirely on the grounds 
that the rule would not achieve predicted safety benefits.  In overturning that rescission, the Court 
emphasized obvious regulatory alternatives that should have been explored if the agency really 
were trying to advance safety, as the governing statute required.148  The Court did not put its 
holding in terms of pretext, instead concluding that the agency was not acting reasonably to achieve 
its safety goals. However, an implicit corollary of concluding that an agency’s policy undercuts its 
stated goals is that those goals probably weren’t really motivating the agency in the first place.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm highlighted this point, accusing the majority 
of going too far in overturning the agency out of a concern that the agency’s decision was actually 
driven by political considerations.149  Moreover, approaching pretext as part of a general arbitrary 
and capriciousness review has the advantage of forestalling the need for an extra-record 
investigation into a decisionmaker’s subjective motivations, thereby addressing Thomas’s 
concerns about such inquiries.  It similarly avoids the need for courts to specify the extent to which 
political considerations can legitimately affect agency action, a notoriously difficult line to draw 
and one courts have long evaded.150 
 
Of course, approaching pretext as part of general arbitrary and capriciousness review will 
fail to police against pretextual rationales in contexts where the agency’s action is otherwise well-
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supported.151 Yet that seems a worthwhile trade-off; at least absent allegations that the undisclosed 
rationale is invidious, the burdens of extra-record investigation into pretext are harder to defend 
when the agency action is independently supportable.  The real risk in this context is that this 
independent support will turn out to be manufactured or insubstantial.  But that risk can be 
mitigated by subjecting stated agency rationales to more skeptical and probing scrutiny in the face 
of evidence of pretextual decisionmaking.  
 
Hence, this surrogate role of arbitrary and capriciousness review highlights again the oddity 
of Chief Justice Roberts’s split opinion, combining highly deferential review of the substantive 
basis for adding the citizenship question with invalidation of the decision on pretextual grounds. 
Justice Breyer’s partial dissent provided the skeptical scrutiny that Roberts’s opinion lacked, 
closely examining evidence in the record about the impact of the question on different groups.  He 
concluded that that the administrative record established that adding the question would only 
impose costs and yield no benefits; it would “diminish the accuracy of the enumeration of 
population” while at the same time “produce citizenship data that is less accurate, not more.”152  
And he rejected the Secretary’s use of uncertainty as a basis for discounting the Census Bureau’s 
estimates of harmful effects, arguing that uncertainty is endemic in regulatory contexts and does 
not excuse an agency from not at least explaining why it decided to “tak[e] action without 
‘engaging in a search for further evidence.’”153   
 
Despite their very different applications of arbitrary and capriciousness review, both 
Roberts and Breyer, as well as Thomas and Alito, invoked State Farm as guiding their analyses.  
Whether State Farm and the Court’s arbitrary and capriciousness precedents require searching 
scrutiny is a matter of scholarly dispute,154 and there are many decisions in which courts stress 
uncertainty and take a more forgiving stance, as the Supreme Court did here.155  The broader point 
is that arbitrary and capriciousness scrutiny is malleable, with judges able to dial their scrutiny up 
and down based their assessments of contextual factors in a particular case.  For his part, Breyer 
underscored this malleability, insisting that “[c]ourts do not apply these principles of 
administrative law mechanically. Rather, they take into account ... the nature and importance of 
the particular decision, the relevance and importance of missing information, and the inadequacies 
of a particular explanation in light of their importance.”156 
 
3. Politics, Deference, and Discretion.  What then led some justices in Department of 
Commerce to dial down their scrutiny of the substantive reasonableness of Ross’s decisionmaking 
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and others to dial it up?  Several factors appeared to be in play, most centrally politics and 
discretion. 
 
Politics surfaced most prosaically in Justice Thomas’s opinion, with Thomas repeatedly 
accusing the district court of invalidating the citizenship question out of bias against the Trump 
Administration. Thomas insisted that only bias could explain the district court’s detailed record 
review and findings of pretext: “I do not deny that a judge predisposed to distrust the Secretary or 
the administration could arrange those facts [from the record] on a corkboard and—with a jar of 
pins and a spool of string—create an eye-catching conspiracy web.”157   That three Supreme Court 
justices signed onto such a pointed attack on the impartiality of a lower court judge is 
extraordinary, all the more so given that five of their colleagues agreed with the district court’s 
analysis, at least in part.   It is also deeply ironic, for by launching this attack these justices were 
themselves embedding a partisan message in the pages of the U.S. Reports.  After all, the prime 
expositor of the claim that lower court judges who rule against the Trump Administration’s actions 
are doing so out of bias is President Trump himself.158   
 
But politics also appeared in a more principled form, in differing views of the relationship 
between political accountability and deference to agency policymaking.  For Roberts, such 
deference rests fundamentally on principles of political accountability.  Provided the policy 
choices of an agency’s political leaders are at least plausible, they should be respected.  Contrary 
views of career bureaucrats should get little weight, if not be viewed with outright suspicion.  As 
he put it, “the Census Act authorizes the Secretary, not the [Census] Bureau, to make policy 
choices within the range of reasonable options.”159  Indeed, a desire to reaffirm the importance of 
judicial deference to the policy choices of agencies’ political leadership seems the best explanation 
of Roberts’s decision hold that adding the citizenship question per se was not arbitrary and 
capricious, even as he invalidated Ross’s decision as pretextual.  Roberts also made a point of 
underscoring the legitimacy of political influence in his discussion of pretext, insisting that “a court 
may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been influenced 
by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s priorities.”160  One benefit of 
Roberts’s split vote is that it allowed him reinforce this structural principle of political control of 
policy while still protecting the Court from sanctioning blatant manipulations and falsehoods. 
 
Justice Breyer, by contrast, tied deference for discretionary agency decisions closely to 
expertise and carefully reasoned explanation.  He treated the fact that Ross deviated from the 
recommendations of the agency’s in house experts, the Census Bureau, as grounds for a probing 
judicial reception.161  Breyer did not deny that an agency’s head’s “policy choice between two 
reasonable but uncertain options” would deserve deference.162  But he argued that the Census 
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Bureau’s memos showed that the option of adding the question was not reasonable and the extent 
of uncertainty was exaggerated.163 Indeed, far from viewing political accountability as compelling 
deference here, Breyer argued that letting Ross’s decision stand risked “undermining public 
confidence in the integrity of our democratic system itself,” given the importance of an accurate 
census for political representation.164  Interestingly, Justice Breyer and the liberal justices 
concurring with him appeared far more amenable to connecting politics and deference in Kisor.  
There, they joined Kagan’s opinion tying deference to authoritative interpretations by agency 
heads and identifying political accountability as a basis for deference.  This divergence is 
potentially explainable on the grounds that Kisor did not involve a conflict between political 
accountability and expertise, but unfortunately the contrast was never addressed by Breyer—
leaving the impression that opposition to adding the citizenship question may have animated his 
more stringent scrutiny here. 
 
Similarly, the conservative justices’ emphasis on political accountability as grounds for 
deference seems in tension with Justice Gorsuch’s identification of the political nature of agency 
decisionmaking as counting strongly against deference in Kisor.  Justice Thomas explained the 
difference between the two cases as lying in the nature of the agency decision at issue: a 
discretionary policy choice versus an interpretation of law.165  Whereas deference to agency legal 
interpretations violated Article III, deference to agency discretionary decisions reflected “a 
‘presumption of regularity’” for the Executive out of “respect for a coordinate branch of 
government whose officers not only take an oath to support the Constitution, as we do, ... but also 
are charged with faithfully executing our laws.”166 Justice Alito went even further, arguing that the 
broad discretion Congress gave the Secretary of Commerce over the content of the census meant 
that courts had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decisionmaking at all.167 
 
Although this emphasis on discretion helped align the conservative justices’ stances in 
Department of Commerce and Kisor, it highlighted a conflict between Department of Commerce 
and Gundy.  In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent—joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas—argued strongly that broad congressional delegations of authority to the executive 
branch were unconstitutional:  Congress can delegate to the executive power to “fill up the details” 
once “Congress had announced the controlling general policy”; Congress can also delegate 
factfinding responsibilities and assign “wide discretion” over matters in which the executive 
independently enjoys broad authority, such as foreign affairs.168  But what Congress cannot do is 
delegate to the executive power to “make the policy judgments” incorporated in “generally 
applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”169  Plainly, the 
responsibilities delegated to the Secretary under the Census Act are far more policy-laden than just 
factfinding, and decades of dispute over including a question on citizenship make clear that adding 
it cannot be seen as just filling up the details of the census either.  Responsibility for the census is 
constitutionally assigned to Congress and not an area of inherent executive authority.  Moreover,  
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private persons are required to fill out the census, and the fact that not responding to the census is 
considered a misdemeanor170 creates another parallel to Gundy, though the criminal consequences 
of violating the statute at issue there were far more severe.  In short, the breadth of discretion given 
to the Secretary that the conservative justices rely on to justify deference in Department of 
Commerce appears to be precisely the kind of delegation that several of them would have held 




II.  The Many Isms of Roberts Court Administrative Law 
 
 The Roberts Court is clearly conflicted when it comes to administrative law. Kisor and 
Department of Commerce showcase a Court divided on administrative law substance and 
methodology, with the Justices diverging notably even when they ostensibly agree on the 
governing legal framework.  Moreover, these divides frequently map the growing ideological and 
partisan divides on the Court:  The 2018 term found Justice Kagan often leading the liberal 
Democratic-appointed justices in defending established administrative law, while Justice Gorsuch 
was often at the forefront of the conservative Republican-appointed justices in attacking existing 
doctrine and Chief Justice Roberts stood squarely in the middle.172  Given that administrative law 
cases frequently carry high political stakes, such a stark ideological and partisan divide should be 
particularly troubling for those worried about the Court being seen as a politicized actor.173  The 
Justices’ flipped stances on deference between these two cases reinforces that politicized 
appearance.  
 
Drill further down, and several analytic tensions become apparent.  These are familiar 
analytic divides from public law more broadly, but their appearance in the administrative law 
context is more recent.  These tensions—between formalism and anti-formalism, originalism and 
more general historicism, textualism and common law development—provide the intellectual 
underpinnings for today’s battles over administrative law.  Yet it is hard to see these divisions as 
driving Roberts Court administrative law.  In particular, these analytic tensions do not consistently 
map onto the justices’ line-ups in administrative law cases or the ideological divisions on the Court. 
 
A.  Formalism and Non-Formalism 
 
The first clearly evident conceptual divide centers on formalism.  One group of justices is 
deeply formalist in approach across a range of administrative law issues, while another is resolutely 
non-formalist.  Non-formalism on the Roberts Court is hard to define specifically; it encompasses 
a range of approaches from legal realism, to pragmatism, functionalism, and minimalism.   The 
2018 Term decisions suggest that while formalism has a greater presence on the Court now than 
for many decades, it has yet to secure a committed majority.  
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1.  Legal Realism versus Legal Formalism. Underlying current disputes over deference to 
administrative determinations lies a fundamental disagreement on the nature of legal interpretation 
and the relationship of law and policy.174  This is clearest in Kisor.  There, Justice Gorsuch 
portrayed law as fixed, determinate, and categorically distinct from policy.175  This categorical 
distinction between law and policy, and correspondingly between legal interpretation and policy 
choice, was essential for his argument that deference to agency regulatory interpretations violates 
Article III.  That argument hinged on the Marbury claim that “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”176 along with an insistence that courts must 
exercise independent judgment in order to adequately perform this law declaring function.177  But 
if regulatory interpretation constitutes policy choice to a significant degree, such interpretation 
appears less the type of law-declaring activity that on Gorsuch’s account is constitutionally 
assigned to the courts’ independent purview and into which the political branches may not 
intrude.178   
 
Justice Kagan’s statement in Kisor that “sometimes … law runs out,” leaving “policy-laden 
choice” 179 at first might suggest a similar view of law and policy as distinct entities.  But her 
argument was actually the opposite.  Her insistence that regulatory ambiguity is inevitable, and 
that law is incomplete and cannot resolve all legal disputes, painted law and legal interpretation as 
intrinsically linked to policy choice.  And she moved from arguing that legal interpretation in the 
context of regulatory ambiguity involves policy choice to the claim that in many instances 
Congress would likely want that policy choice to rest in the hands of an expert, experienced 
agency.  From there, Auer deference followed.   
 
The classical image of law as fixed, determinate, and categorically distinct from policy is 
highly formalist, whereas the view of law as indeterminate and inevitably entailing policy choice 
typifies legal realism.180 The terms of this debate are thus familiar, but its surfacing today is more 
surprising.  The legal realist view of law has dominated administrative law ever since the 
cementing of the administrative state in the 1940s.181  Adrian Vermeule has described the ensuing 
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years as a time of law’s ever-growing abnegation, with law pushed to the margins as more and 
more decisions appeared in a policy guise better fit for agencies than courts.182  Even when 
formalism made a comeback in related public law fields, as occurred with the advent of textualism 
in statutory interpretation in the 1980s,183 ordinary administrative law retained its realist 
orientation.  After all, it was in 1984 that the Chevron Court justified deference to reasonable 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, arguing that in those contexts 
interpretation entails a policy choice implicitly delegated to the agency.184 
 
In its current incarnation in Roberts Court administrative law, legal realism surfaces in a 
domesticated legal process guise.185  Law is not portrayed as entirely or necessarily indeterminate; 
even realist-inclined justices often conclude that agency statutory interpretations fail Chevron and 
are not deserving of deference.186  Moreover, Justice Kagan’s arguments for deference in Kisor 
echo legal process’s focus on a rational Congress and the institutional capacities of courts and 
agencies.  Critically, moreover, Kagan ties deference not to abstract institutional features, but 
instead to judicial determinations of whether particular decisions reflect agencies’ comparative 
institutional advantages.187 Richard Pildes has used the term “institutional realism” to capture this 
sensitivity to “how these institutions actually function in, and over, time.”188  Justice Breyer’s 
opinion in Department of Commerce is to the same effect:  Deference turns on whether a specific 
agency decision shows expertise and informed, thorough consideration; it does not follow 
automatically from the fact that the decision represents a policy question or was made by a 
politically accountable actor.189  
 
By contrast, legal formalism in Roberts Court administrative law takes a categorical 
approach to policy questions as well as legal questions.  Two distinct formalist approaches to 
policy are evident in this Term’s decisions.  On the one hand, there is Justice Gorsuch’s separation 
of powers formalism in Gundy, which classifies broad policy determinations as categorically 
legislative and constitutionally excluded from agencies’ ambit.  On the other, there is Justice 
Thomas’s effort in Department of Commerce to preserve an arena for administrative policy 
judgments largely immune from judicial review, at the same time as he would banish policy from 
the world of law.  Justice Kavanaugh signaled a similar effort in Kisor when he urged courts to 
“engage in appropriately rigorous scrutiny of an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, and ... 
simultaneously be appropriately deferential to an agency’s reasonable policy choices within the 
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discretion allowed by a regulation.”190 Jeffrey Pojanowski has offered a sustained analytic defense 
of such a conjoined approach, which he terms neoclassical administrative law.  The aim is precisely 
“to sharpen the line between law and policy in administrative law, with the consequence of 
increasing judicial responsibility on questions of law while decreasing it on matters [of] 
policymaking discretion.”191  
 
At first glance, a neoclassical approach might seem to offer a happy compromise of 
formalism and realism, respecting constitutional lines and also comparative institutional strengths.  
But combining legal formalism and policy deference in this fashion is unlikely to succeed.  Any 
sharp demarcation between questions of law and questions of policy is implausible—as a practical 
as well as a conceptual matter.  In an increasingly statutory and regulatory world such as ours, 
policy choices rarely surface in law-free zones.  The choices judges will make in construing law 
will inevitably significantly curtail the space left for policy.  Although Kavanaugh argued that 
“open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible’ or ‘practicable’ ... afford agencies 
broad policy discretion,”192 courts accustomed to definitively resolving interpretive ambiguity on 
their own may find these terms to have definite legal content as well.193  Moreover, the arguments 
for deference to agencies on fact and policy matters—such as agencies’ greater political 
accountability, expertise, or congressional authorization—also push towards deference in law 
application, which easily spills over into law interpretation.194 As Vermeule has put it, “[l]ogically, 
there [is] no necessary contradiction” between courts according deference to agencies on ordinary 
fact questions and exercising independent judgment on questions of law, but “the deep premises 
and attitude of each [a]re inconsistent with the deep premises and attitude of the other.”195 In like 
vein, Kristin Hickman, and Nicholas Bednar contend that recognition of the institutional benefits 
of agency policymaking make something akin to Chevron deference inevitable.196  Even on a more 
theoretical plane, legal formalism and broad policy deference to agencies do not easily combine.  
Legal formalism goes hand-in-hand with a broader separation of powers formalism that, as noted, 
views agency policy determinations as executive branch usurpation of the legislative power. 
 
2.  Formalism, Functionalism, and Remedial Minimalism in Separation of Powers 
Analysis. Although legal determinacy formalism was largely absent on the Court until recently, 
formalism has had a steady presence in separation of powers analysis.  Separation of powers 
formalism evinces the same commitment to categorical lines, with the relevant lines here being 
constitutional distinctions among legislative, executive, and judicial power, each of which is 
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viewed as formally vested in one branch of government with intermixing limited to those instances 
expressly sanctioned in the Constitution.  By contrast, a more functionalist analysis views powers 
as overlapping, emphasizes the overall balance among the branches, and focuses on the benefits 
of a particular governmental structure and that structure’s impact on a branch’s ability to perform 
its core functions.197  As many commentators have argued, formalism and functionalism should 
not be viewed as opposed approaches in the separation of powers context; most decisions have 
elements of both orientations, and both approaches share key elements, such as a concern about 
aggrandized power.198  Yet still, they represent discrete stances between which the Court alternates 
in its separation of powers jurisprudence. 
 
These formalist and functionalist orientations were clearly on display this term.  Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinions in Gundy and Kisor were paradigms of formalist separation of powers analysis, 
arguing that the Constitution’s text draws clear lines between the distinct categories of executive, 
legislative, and judicial power.199 Yet he ultimately justified strict enforcement of the 
Constitution’s distribution of powers in teleological terms, in particular as essential to protecting 
individual liberty and guarding against “arbitrary use of governmental power.”200  Kagan barely 
engaged Gorsuch’s lengthy constitutional attack on Auer, but her dismissive response was largely 
functionalist, noting that the Court had long upheld mixing of executive and judicial functions in 
agencies and emphasizing that judges were able to check agency regulation interpretations under 
Auer.201  Functionalism also dominated Kagan’s constitutional defense of delegation in Gundy, 
where she offered a vision of separation of powers that stressed flexibility, practicality, and 
effectiveness before reframing the case as being about statutory interpretation rather than 
constitutional structure.202  And Chief Justice Roberts elevated realism over formalism in 
Department of Commerce, when he insisted that the Court was not naïve and would not fall for 
Ross’s contrived VRA justification.203   
 
Although in the 2018 Term formalist arguments fell short, at other times the Roberts Court 
has taken a formalist approach to separation of powers and constitutional structural analysis 
generally.204  Examples include two leading opinions written by Chief Justice Roberts: Free 
Enterprise Fund, which imposed a categorical prohibition on double for cause removal protection; 
and Stern v Marshall, which drew a bright-line distinction between public and private rights for 
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purposes of determining when adjudication outside of the Article III courts is constitutional.205  
Yet there have also been notable instances when the Court has taken a more functionalist stance.  
In NLRB v Noel Canning, the Court took a pragmatic approach to interpreting the scope of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, justifying its reading as necessary to serve the Clause’s purpose and 
supported by longstanding practice.206  And in Wellness International Network v Sharif, the Court 
held that consent of the parties can make some forms of non-Article III adjudication constitutional, 
insisting that analysis of this “question must be decided not by ‘formalistic and unbending rules,’ 
but ‘with an eye to the practical effect that the” practice “will have on the constitutionally assigned 
role of the federal judiciary.’”207 Even the Court’s more formalist decisions can have a heavy 
functionalist component; a key driver of Free Enterprise, for example, is “the Court’s own 
functional assessment of how much accountability executive officers properly owe to the 
President.”208  
 
As important, even the Roberts Court’s formalistic separation of powers decisions are often 
cabined in ways that suggest concern with minimizing their practical impact.  Free Enterprise 
Fund and Stern are again good examples of this phenomenon.  In Free Enterprise, Roberts’s 
majority opinion took a minimalist approach to remedying its finding that double for cause 
removal protection for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was 
unconstitutional, signaling in the process that it was not calling single-for-cause protection into 
question. Insisting that the unconstitutional double-for-cause provision could be severed while 
leaving the Board otherwise intact, the Court rejected greater “blue-pencil[ing]” of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act provisions  as a job “belong[ing] to the Legislature, not the Judiciary.”209  In a similar 
vein, Roberts’s majority opinion in Stern not only suggested a carve out for administrative 
adjudication, but also retained a broad definition of public right and reaffirmed precedents that 
sanctioned a broad role for non-Article III adjudication.210  The question of whether to continue 
with this minimalist approach to remedying separation of powers violations is now before the 
Court, with the justices adding a question on severability to their consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s a single-director structure.211 
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Such remedial minimalism might seem at first to be functionalist, insofar as it tailors the 
constitutional remedies to limit disruption and preserve as much of Congress’s work as possible.  
Formalist separation of powers decisions are famous for casting aside analogous concerns of 
convenience, efficiency and utility in service of upholding separation of power principles.212  On 
the other hand, rejection of greater remedial creativity as outside of the judicial role sounds in a 
formalist register.  More significantly, remedial minimalism is likely critical for the success of 
separation of powers formalism in practice.  Otherwise, adoption of separation of powers 
formalism might well entail substantial transformation in the national administrative state, as 
Justice Gorsuch suggested in his Kisor and Gundy opinions—a result that might make a majority 
of the Court less willing to sustain formalist arguments.  From this perspective, remedial 
minimalism appears primarily as a strategic device, one that makes separation of powers formalism 
more palatable, even if analytically more aligned with functionalism. 
 
*     *     * 
In short, the Roberts Court is simultaneously formalist and nonformalist approach in its 
approach to administrative law.  Greater coherence exists within the two ideological camps, with 
conservatives often taking a more formalist view and the liberals being more non-formalist and 
specifically functionalist in orientation.  Even here, however, there are noteworthy inconsistencies. 
Several conservative justices have signed onto opinions stating deference to agency legal 
interpretations can be constitutional,213 as well as taken a minimalist or even functionalist approach 
to separation of powers.214  And the same is true of the Roberts Court liberals, who at times have 
been willing to pull back on deference or adopt formalist approaches to separation of powers.215 
These inconsistencies in part reflect the fact that anti-administrativist views have been gradually 
emerging, as well as strategic defensive compromises.  But the overall effect is to suggest a court 
deciding cases on a somewhat ad hoc basis. 
 
B.  Originalism and Historicism 
 
A second prominent feature of many Roberts Court administrative law opinions is their 
focus on the past.  To some extent, this is simply a manifestation of originalism’s increased role in 
Roberts Court constitutional analysis, combined with the heavy constitutional flavor of attacks on 
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established administrative law.216 The historical lens often extends beyond the Founding, however, 
to include consideration of judicial precedent and sometimes governmental practice over the 
nineteenth century.  This wider scope reflects broader trends in constitutional interpretation and 
originalist scholarship, in particular emphasis on political branch practices as constructing 
constitutional meaning or liquidating constitutional meaning over time.217  As Sophia Lee has 
suggested, this wider historical orientation also reflects anti-administrativists’ view of the nation’s 
first century as a period of limited administrative government and judicial ascendancy in enforcing 
the law.218   
 
In prior terms, Justice Thomas has most consistently and comprehensively developed the 
originalist attack on modern administrative law.  In the 2018 Term, this role fell to Justice Gorsuch.  
Originalism underlies Gorsuch’s formalist account of law and the judicial power in Kisor, but 
especially dominates his Gundy dissent, which opens with a lengthy discussion of the Framers’ 
views of constitutional structure, legislative power, and their fear of excessive law-making.219  
Gorsuch also takes a wider historical lens, however.  In Kisor, he examined the Court’s precedents 
on deference over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show that Auer was a historical 
aberration.220  Similarly, in Gundy he reviewed the Court’s delegation jurisprudence over time to 
show that, even if the Court upheld delegations, it nonetheless adhered to his account of the narrow 
bounds of constitutional delegation until the 1940s.  Indeed, in both opinions Gorsuch portrays the 
post-New Deal ear of the 1940s as a period of sharp break from longstanding traditions.221   
 
No doubt, Justice Gorsuch’s engagement with nineteenth and early twentieth century 
jurisprudence is in part a strategic effort to rebut what on the surface seem strong stare decisis 
arguments for retaining current administrative law doctrines.  Yet this engagement is also evidence 
of the limited sway originalism actually has in Roberts Court opinions attacking the administrative 
state.  Indeed, despite its frequent invocation, originalism often has a superficial cast in these 
opinions, surfacing primarily in claims that administrative government is at odds with the general 
separation of powers principles and concerns of the framers, rather than in evidence of originalist 
rejection of specific practices.222 A prime example is Gorsuch’s opinion in Gundy, which based its 
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nondelegation arguments on abstract accounts of the framers’ views of constitutional structure and 
legislative power, rather than focusing on actual delegations from the period.223 
 
Interestingly, the historical lens is not limited to administrative law’s opponents. 
Administrative law’s judicial defenders often adopt a historicist stance as well.  To be sure, they 
give more weight to recent history than their anti-administrative colleagues, but recent history for 
these purposes often stretches back eighty to ninety years. Thus, in Kisor and Gundy Justice Kagan 
emphasized lines of precedents dating back to the 1940s and before that upheld deference to 
agencies’ regulatory interpretations and broad delegations.224  Perhaps the starkest historicist 
defense of established administrative arrangements came in Justice Breyer’s 2014 majority opinion 
in NLRB v Noel Canning.  In that case, Breyer drew on political branch practices going back to 
Founding as well as the post-World War II period to hold that the recess appointment power could 
be used during an intrasession recess and with respect to vacancies that existed before the recess 
commenced.225 Moreover, Breyer expressly justified historical practice as particularly important 
in separation of powers challenges, a marked contrast to his view four years earlier in Free 
Enterprise Fund that historical practices at the time of the Founding did not offer “significant help” 
in assessing a separation of powers challenge to removal protections.226 
 
In short, justices of all stripes are increasingly looking to past practices and historical 
precedents in administrative law cases.  Department of Commerce showcased this trend too.  
There, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas emphasized the long historical practice of 
including a citizenship question on the census as far back as 1782, with Roberts holding  that this 
“early understanding ... and long practice” meant that asking about citizenship did not violate the 
Enumeration Clause.227 Justice Breyer similarly relied on the history of the census, but the 
historical account he offered put prime emphasis on transformations in how the census was 
conducted after 1950, in response to concerns about high undercounting rates.228 
 
Historical battles also dominate recent administrative law scholarship.  Prominent attacks 
on administrative government by Philip Hamburger, Joseph Postell, and others argue that current 
national administrative government marks a stark departure from expectations and practices at the 
Founding through the nineteenth century.229  Their accounts are disputed by historians offering 
numerous studies of administrative governance dating back just as far.230  The extent of judicial 
deference to administrative legal interpretations is an issue of particular historical dispute.  In an 
article cited by Justice Gorsuch in Kisor, Aditya Bamzai contends that before the 1940s the 
Supreme Court did not have a tradition of deferring to executive interpretations, as Justice Scalia 
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among others had maintained.  Instead, the Court “‘respected’ longstanding and contemporaneous 
executive  interpretations of law as part of a practice of deferring to longstanding and 
contemporaneous interpretation generally.”231  Disagreeing with Bamzai, Craig Green maintains 
that the Court’s jurisprudence is more varied and supportive of deference to executive actors, 
identifying instances in which the Court suggested that “the construction given to a statute by those 
charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration.”232  
And Lee argues that early administrative agencies “had the first and often final word on the 
Constitution’s meaning” such that “reinstating the 19th century constitutional order ... would all 
but eliminate judicial review of [agency] actions’ constitutionality.”233 
 
This historical scholarship holds important lessons for current debates over administrative 
law and the administrative state more broadly.  The extensive history of administrative agencies 
operating from the nation’s beginnings to today undercuts efforts to paint contemporary 
administrative government as a fundamental deviation from the Constitution.  To be sure, the 
extent of administrative authority existing before the twentieth century is disputed.  In addition, 
much of the early national administrative state was developmental and distributional, with many 
administrative agencies operating in the territories or implementing administrative regimes that 
involved matters of public right.234  Still, too many early examples exist of broad administrative 
discretion, coercive administrative actions targeting private rights, and limited judicial review to 
justify accounts that portray administrative government and administrative law as twentieth 
century aberrations.235  
 
Moreover, it is unclear why the public right focus and territorial operation of early 
administrative regimes should limit their historical significance. Those were the primary contexts 
in which the national government of the time was active, and its actions had tremendous 
importance for the individuals affected.236  Although some administrative skeptics view this 
history as suggesting that administrative power to regulate and adjudicate private rights is 
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limited,237 an alternative lesson to draw is that the national government has always relied on 
agencies when it decides to act.  And it is possible to understand many forms of contemporary 
regulation, particularly those involving permits and licenses or that create statutory rights and 
obligations, as modern-day versions of public rights—indeed, for many decades the Supreme 
Court has taken just such an approach.238  Thus, even if this history is viewed as limited to public 
rights, it would still carry substantial relevance in establishing the historical legitimacy of 
administrative governance.   
 
Hence, originalism and historicism may turn out to be powerful tools in administrative 
government’s defense. At the same time, framing the defense of administrative law and 
administrative government in historical terms has the downside of suggesting that the acceptable 
bounds and forms of administrative action are set by what has been done before. This leads to 
novelty and innovation being viewed as indications that an administrative arrangement is 
constitutionally suspect, a position advanced in several Roberts Court opinions.239  But as the DC 
Circuit recently stated, such a view is at odds with the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence, 
which has often sustained measures that were novel in their day.240  Nor is such a constraint easily 
squared with the Constitution’s text, which gives Congress broad power to structure government 
as it sees fit.241 
 
A historical lens can also stand in tension with efforts to rethink constitutional and 
administrative law to better fit current realities.242  This tension is particularly acute when the 
historical lens is an originalist one, as the worlds of 1789 and 2019 are far apart when it comes to 
the shape and responsibilities of national government.  But even a more limited backwards-looking 
gaze may ill-fit efforts to address the governance crises of today.  Two of the most salient 
characteristics of contemporary national government are the deep political polarization that has 
stymied congressional action on pressing issues and increasingly bold assertions of presidential 
power that undercut established administrative practices and legal regimes.243  Although both have 
surfaced in earlier eras, their combination and intensity today create governance challenges that 
did not exist even a generation ago, and their resolution may necessitate experimenting with 
structural arrangements at odds with traditional governmental models. 
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C. APA Textualism, APA Originalism, and Administrative Common Law 
 
A third analytic contrast in Roberts Court administrative law concerns the different stances 
the justices take towards the APA and other administrative law statutes.  The Roberts Court is 
often described as textualist in its approach to statutory interpretation, including by the justices 
themselves.244  Whether this is a wholly accurate description is a matter of debate; the Court has 
deviated from textualism in several prominent statutory interpretation cases.245 In the 
administrative law context, at least, the Roberts Court has equivocated between textualist and 
common-law approaches to major administrative law statutes. 
 
Textualism was supreme in Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association in 2015.246  Although 
the APA expressly exempts interpretive rules from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, 
D.C. Circuit doctrine had held that once an agency issued a definitive interpretation of a regulation, 
the agency had to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to change that interpretation.247  The 
Roberts Court unanimously reversed, with the majority opinion emphasizing that  the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach was “contrary to the clear text of the APA's rulemaking provisions.”248 
Textualism also dominated the Court’s approach to the Freedom of Information Act in Food 
Marketing Institute v Argus Leader, a 2018 Term decision rejecting a widely-followed lower court 
interpretation of FOIA’s Exemption 4 as protecting confidential information from disclosure only 
when disclosure would cause competitive harm.  That interpretation, according to Justice 
Gorsuch’s majority opinion for a 6-3 Court, ignored that “[i]n statutory interpretation disputes, a 
court’s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of 
the law itself.  Where ... that examination yields a clear answer, judges must stop.”249   
 
Text also featured in Kisor, with Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch battling over the 
meaning of §706.  This battle took an originalist cast, focusing on what the APA’s text was 
understood to mean when originally adopted.  Gorsuch drew on the APA’s legislative history and 
contemporaneous scholarly accounts to argue that the APA was originally understood to require 
de novo judicial review of legal questions, while Kagan countered with evidence that the APA’s 
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enactors had intended §706 to restate the existing common-law approach to judicial review.250 
Chief Justice  Roberts’s narrow join left this debate over the APA’s meaning in a 4-4 tie.  Yet 
Kisor is fundamentally a reaffirmation of administrative common law.  Kagan’s refinement of 
Auer’s limits for a majority of the Court was the epitome of common law doctrinal elaboration, 
and upholding the doctrine on stare decisis gave ultimate priority to judicial precedent.  For all his 
textualism with respect to §706, even Justice Gorsuch left room for some judicial development of 
judicial review doctrine in his embrace of Skidmore and his insistence that Auer violates § 553’s 
notice-and-comment requirements because of its practical effects, despite the section’s express 
exception for interpretive rules.251 
 
Common law development of judicial review doctrine was further on display in 
Department of Commerce.  Indeed, administrative common law was a constant baseline in the 
case, with all the justices relying on State Farm despite its expansion of arbitrary and 
capriciousness review beyond its original meaning.252  But administrative common law was even 
more prominent in Chief Justice Roberts’s elaboration of a prohibition on pretext for a majority of 
the Court—a prohibition that as mentioned above, was implicit in existing case law but not 
expressly developed.253  Moreover, despite taking a textual approach to statutory interpretation in 
other contexts, Roberts never stopped to respond to Justice Thomas’s complaint that such a pretext 
inquiry and adding extra-record materials had no basis in the APA’s text.254  Instead, he simply 
invoked the Court’s precedents for going beyond the record if a strong showing of bad faith is 
made and the APA’s requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.255   
 
Viewing the 2018 term opinions along with earlier precedent, it becomes clear that many 
of the justices’ views on textualist versus common law interpretations of administrative law 
statutes do not track their ideological divisions or overall stance on administrative government.  
Instead, many individual justices largely oscillate between administrative law textualism and a 
more common law stance, as does the Court as a whole. 256  To some extent, this oscillation may 
reflect the specific administrative law measures at issue. For example, FOIA’s text is far more 
detailed and more recently amended than the APA, which helps explain the contrast between Argus 
Leader on the one hand and Kisor and Department of Commerce on the other, all decided in the 
2018 Term.  And the Court’s notably greater textualism in Perez than Kisor and Department of 
Commerce may result from the fact that Perez involved the APA’s procedural requirements rather 
than its provisions for judicial review.  Not only are the APA’s procedural requirements more 
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detailed and specific than its judicial review provisions, but the Court has allowed courts more 
leeway to develop the latter.257  
 
 Significantly, however, such oscillation between APA textualism and administrative 
common law is not a new phenomenon.  For many decades, the Court has periodically rejected 
administrative common law as being at odds with the APA while simultaneously developing new 
administrative common law doctrines.  Despite this oscillation, the common law approach to the 
APA has dominated, especially in the area of judicial review.258  The paradigm example is 
Chevron, which never referenced §706’s text at all and justified its two-step approach to deference 
on a combination of imputed congressional intent, precedent, pragmatic factors, and constitutional 
structure.259  
 
A growing number of scholars now argue for APA originalism and critique the common 
law approach to the APA.260 The arguments against administrative common law range from 
defenses of textualist statutory interpretation writ large to attacks on the legitimacy of judicial 
lawmaking to concerns about the harmful effects of specific common-law developed doctrines.261  
Notably, these critiques are offered by scholars with a range of views about judicial deference to 
agencies and administrative government more broadly.  In particular, prominent defenders of the 
administrative state have advocated that [courts?] should follow the APA’s original meaning and 
text.262  Critiques of administrative common law also are not limited to the APA; John Brinkerhoff 
has defended the Roberts Court’s recent FOIA textualism on the grounds that lower courts’ 
common law interpretations of FOIA wrongly downplayed FOIA’s pro-disclosure orientation and 
instead imposed a “strong pro-government gloss over nearly all of FOIA.”263 
 
This growing scholarship underscores the potential pitfalls of administrative common law.  
But as I have argued elsewhere, it is important to separate out the merits and demerits of particular 
common law doctrines from the general enterprise of administrative common law.264  I am 
skeptical of efforts to broadly replace administrative common law with a textual and originalist 
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approach to the APA.  The APA’s text often supports alternative readings, as made clear by the 
dueling accounts of §706 in Kisor and the strong and weak forms of arbitrary and capriciousness 
review in Department of Commerce.  Moreover, the original meaning of the APA was and remains 
contested.265  George Shepherd has described “the fight over the APA” as “a pitched political battle 
for the life of the New Deal.”  This battle meant that key provisions of the APA were left 
intentionally ambiguous so that agreement on the APA could be reached.  And it meant that the 
APA’s legislative history was intentionally manipulated by both sides to advance their cause, 
leaving contradictory sources for future interpreters.266  One clear data point, however, is that the 
Supreme Court never viewed the APA as overturning administrative common law or its judicial 
review precedents, other than imposing a more searching version of substantial evidence review.267   
 
As important, administrative common law is an inevitable and legitimate phenomenon in 
our constitutional separation of powers system.268  It is inevitable given the difficulties Congress 
faces in legislating and the practical impossibility of specifying answers to newly emergent 
administrative law issues in advance.  The result is that courts end up tasked with policing agency 
actions under statutory constraints that increasingly are out-of-step with administrative realities.  
Of course, courts could leave the necessary updating to Congress, and sometimes do.  But 
experience shows that—at least with a capaciously-worded statute—courts feel a practical 
imperative to perform that updating role rather than simply apply administrative constraints ill-
suited to serving congressional purposes in the face of changed realities.269  Administrative law’s 
trans-substantive nature, which means that the effects of not gapfilling or updating would mean 
inadequate administrative controls across a wide range of executive branch activities, reinforces 
judges’ inclinations for common-law development.  A similar reinforcing effect comes from 
administrative law’s focus on the structures and procedures that lie at the heart of the 
administrative state, such as the court-agency relationship.  Not only is this relationship difficult 
to capture comprehensively in statutes,270 but courts may view elaboration of judicial review 
doctrines as especially within their bailiwick.   
 
This structural character of administrative law closely relates to a third feature that 
underlies the development of administrative common law: the quasi-constitutional character of 
ordinary administrative law.  Administrative law plays a critical role in building out the 
administrative state, and even more in domesticating the administrative state within the 
                                                 
265 For a detailed articulation of this view with respect to § 706, see Sunstein, 107 Georgetown L J at 1642–57 (cited 
in note 194). 
266 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 
Nw U L Rev 1557, 1560, 1662–63 (1996) (“As the bill’s enactment become imminent, each party to the negotiations 
over the bill attempted to create legislative history—to create a record that would cause future reviewing courts to 
interpret the new statute in a manner that would favor the party.”).   
267 See Sunstein, 107 Georgetown L J at 1653–56 (cited in note 194) (discussing the Court’s adherence to such as 
Gray v Powell, 314 US 402 (1941) and NLRB v Hearst Publications, 322 US 111 (1944)); Green, Deconstructing at 
134–38 (cited in note 232).   
268 This paragraph and the next draws on ideas I set out at length in Metzger, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1320–55 (cited 
in note 96). 
269 A prime example is judicial development and elaboration of judicial review of rulemaking in the face of the 
explosion of social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 Stan L Rev 1189, 1301–09 (1986). 
270 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum L Rev 1749, 1772–73 
(2009). 





constitutional order.  Although rarely judicially acknowledged, the primary means by which courts 
have addressed constitutional concerns about agencies’ powers has been through subconstitutional 
administrative law requirements, such as the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking, rather than 
direct constitutional scrutiny.271  Judicial development of administrative common law reflects this 
use of administrative law to address the constitutional tensions raised by the modern administrative 
state. 
 
To be sure, that administrative common law may be practically inevitable does not render 
it legitimate.  But unlike earlier instances of federal court lawmaking, administrative common law 
does not displace state law or alter the primary rules that govern private behavior.  Instead, it shares 
the focus on uniquely federal interests that marks many legitimate forms of federal common law.272  
Equally central, most administrative common law has a statutory basis to which it is at least loosely 
tethered, such as the judicial review provisions of the APA.  And, critically, to the extent it serves 
to implement separation of powers concerns, administrative common law is part of the elaboration 
of constitutional requirements seen as lying at the core of the judicial role today.   
 
 
III.  Whither Roberts Court Administrative Law? 
 
Focusing simply these analytic themes and tensions, it is hard to discern a clear direction 
for the Roberts Court on administrative law.  The Court is at times formalist and at times 
nonformalist; at times textualist and at times more common law in orientation.  And while its 
administrative law opinions have turned consistently more historicist over recent years, that 
backwards focus has encompassed a range of approaches, from originalism to an emphasis on 
historical practice and precedent. Greater coherence becomes apparent when the justices are 
viewed in their overall ideological groupings, and some individual justices are particularly 
consistent.  But the Court as a whole seems to vacillate in ways that resist principle explanation.  
Instead, the factor that best explains Roberts Court administrative law seems to be the varied 
administrative law jurisprudence of Chief Justice Roberts himself.   
 
Taking a step back, two broader frames emerge from the 2018 Terms decisions and the 
Roberts Court’s administrative law jurisprudence writ large.  One is radical and could portend 
dramatic changes in existing doctrine, the other is incrementalist and seemingly more modulated 
in its reforms.  The incrementalist approach dominated the 2018 Term administrative law decisions 
and there are reasons to think that may continue.  But although these two approaches are 
analytically distinct, in practice both may result in similar pullbacks on administrative authority.  
Moreover, both frames are united in one key regard: increasing judicial supervision of 
administrative government.  And both convey the sense that the administrative state must be 
cabined to guard against unaccountable, aggrandized, and arbitrary administrative power.  Notably 
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absent across both is an affirmative argument for the potential benefits of administrative 
government, other than recognition on the incrementalist side of the value of bureaucratic 
expertise. 
 
The lack of a more robust defense of the administrative state represents a substantial hole 
in Roberts Court administrative law jurisprudence.  Failure to invoke the full range of potential 
benefits from administrative governments makes Roberts Court administrative law jurisprudence 
appear increasingly one-sided and political.  Moreover, a fuller picture of administrative 
government is needed if the Roberts Court’s interventions are to yield a coherent approach to 
administrative law. 
 
A.  Radicalism and Incrementalism in Roberts Court Administrative Law 
 
Viewing the analytic tensions described above in broader perspective, two methodological 
frames emerge from the Roberts Court’s 2018 administrative law decisions.  What stands out in 
Justice Gorsuch’s Kisor opinion is the absolutist and categorical nature of his argument.  He insists 
on the need for clear rules and rejects altogether any claims of stare decisis.273  A similar absolutist 
and categorical character typifies Gorsuch’s approach in Gundy, with his insistence on reviving 
direct constitutional barriers to delegation and unwillingness to address delegation concerns 
through more indirect and subconstitutional means. This uncompromising commitment to 
formalism, originalism, and textualism—evident in Justice Thomas’s opinions as well—has 
potential to radically reshape existing doctrine and administrative institutions.  It would require 
overruling Chevron and Auer deference, as both justices openly acknowledge, but the implications 
of this approach would extend well past deference doctrines. Taken categorically, without 
acceptance of patterns of governance that have emerged over time, a formalist insistence on strict 
lines divide legislative, executive, and judicial power calls into question the combination of 
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication that lies at the heart of modern administrative 
agencies.274 Applying such a division, Gorsuch’s and Thomas’s prior opinions have suggested they 
would pull administrative adjudication back to only covering matters of public right, defined in 
originalist terms.275  Asserting that original understandings so require, they would also deem a 
broad swath of federal government personnel to be principal or inferior officers, thereby rendering 
a large number unconstitutionally appointed.276  Meanwhile, requiring the APA to be applied in 
accordance with its enacted text and original meaning would not just overturn Chevron and Auer 
and entail a pullback in arbitrariness review; it would also throw into doubt longstanding doctrines 
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274 See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U Chi L Rev 297, 298, 312 
(2017).   
275 See Oil States Energy Services, LLC v Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S Ct 1365, 1381–82 (2018) (Gorsuch, J, 
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developing the procedural requirements of notice and comment rulemaking and access to judicial 
review.277 
 
By contrast, Justice Kagan’s Kisor opinion is above all else incrementalist.  Far from 
absolute, it instead emphasizes case-by-case analysis and a commitment to developing precedent 
and existing practice rather than dramatic change.  Such contextualized, precedent and practice-
based analysis has long characterized Justice Breyer’s administrative law opinions.278  And 
incrementalism was also on display in Justice Kagan’s decision in Lucia v SEC, which ruled that 
ALJs at the Securities and Exchange Commission were unconstitutionally appointed inferior 
officers.  In so holding, Kagan wrote about as narrowly as possible, closely following existing 
precedent and refusing to define inferior officer more broadly or consider the scope of the judges’ 
removal protection.279 Perhaps more importantly given his role as the fulcrum of the Court on 
administrative law, Chief Justice Roberts’s administrative law opinions are often incrementalist as 
well.  Although the Chief Justice has advanced formalist principles with a categorical edge, he has 
applied them in a minimalist manner that substantially circumscribes their impact.280 Roberts’s 
penchant for minimalism was particularly clear with his limited and selective join in Kisor, which 
left the law versus policy and APA debates in the case unresolved and instead focused on 
addressing his concerns about Auer deference with minimal disruption to existing doctrine. 
 
In the contest between radicalism and incrementalism during the 2018 Term, 
incrementalism was the victor. This could in part be a reflection of the fact that the 2018 Term was 
a transition year, with Justice Kennedy’s resignation and Justice Kavanaugh replacing him to 
create a solid conservative majority on the Court.  Popular criticism of the Court in response may 
have made Roberts in particular unwilling to adopt more radical positions, and fears that the new 
majority will overturn contentious precedents fueled the repeated debates over stare decisis.281  If 
this pattern continues, then the most radical attacks on the constitutionality of administrative 
governance may not gain majority support.   
 
The counter is Gundy and the constitutionality of broad congressional delegations of 
authority to the executive branch.  Despite his incrementalism elsewhere, the Chief Justice signed 
onto Justice Gorsuch’s constitutional attack on broad delegations of authority to the executive 
branch in Gundy—an attack that Justice Kagan described as meaning that “most of Government 
is unconstitutional.”282 Each of the five conservative justices has now signaled willingness to 
reconsider the Court’s lenient nondelegation doctrine.283 Were the Court to support significant 
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278 See Noel Canning, 573 US 513, 524 (2014) (Breyer, J) (emphasizing that “in interpreting the [Recess 
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constitutional barriers to delegation, that would be a sign of radicalism ascendant in Roberts Court 
administrative law.  However, it remains to be seen how far Roberts, Alito, and Kavanaugh are 
actually willing to go reviving limits on delegation. Their same-term endorsement of broad 
executive branch policy discretion in Department of Commerce may signal that they will not go 
very far.  Previously, both Roberts and Kavanaugh have addressed excessive delegation concerns 
through a statutory interpretation lens rather than broadscale constitutional invalidation, and they 
may opt to continue with such subconstitutional approaches going forward.284 
   
Chief Justice Roberts’s past practice of building up to overruling precedents over time 
rather than in one fell swoop also merits note.285  This might suggest that radical changes in 
administrative law may yet occur, notwithstanding the 2018 term’s incrementalism  Yet Roberts 
has had opportunities to push for more radical administrative law outcomes in the past and not 
pursued them—despite describing administrative government in stark terms that would seem to 
merit a more dramatic response.286  Put differently, when it comes to bottom line results, Roberts’s 
anti-administrativism has often lost out to his Burkean and common law instincts. 
 
Crucially, however, even incrementalism can have a significant impact on existing 
administrative law and administrative institutions.  One need look no further than the aftermath of 
Kisor to see this effect.  In the four-month period after Kisor’s issuance, the courts of appeals 
directly considered whether to apply Auer deference in light of Kisor in thirty cases and deferred 
to the agency’s approach in only ten of those.  In an additional five cases, the court declined 
deference but ultimately upheld the agency’s interpretation, for an overall rate of the government 
prevailing 50% of the time.287 By comparison, studies of the years leading up to Kisor have 
identified the courts as granting Auer deference or the government as prevailing 71% of the time.288  
Similarly, despite their bottom-line minimalism, the Court’s decisions on removal, the status of 
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administrative law judges, and the constitutionality of administrative adjudication have sparked a 
slew of challenges to well-established features of the administrative state.289  And if widespread, 
statutory narrowing of delegated authority in response to background delegation concerns could 
lead to a significant pullback in agency authority. Hence, over time both the radical and 
incrementalist approaches may yield substantial change to existing administrative law.    
 
A final important factor determining the shape of administrative law going forward is what 
happens in the federal appellate courts.  That is the level where most administrative law decisions 
are issued, and where the ultimate impact of the Court’s interventions will be determined.  Chevron 
is the leading example; more than the decision itself, it was subsequent actions by lower courts 
and Justice Scalia that made Chevron canonical.290 Similarly, it will be how the lower courts apply 
Kisor—whether they continue to treat it as significantly narrowing but preserving Auer, or instead 
as essentially doing away with Auer deference or only tweaking Auer at the margins—that will 
establish Kisor’s impact on administrative law in practice. The same is true of Department of 
Commerce’s emphasis on weaker arbitrary and capriciousness review of agency decisionmaking.  
As a result, the Trump Administration’s efforts to stock the federal courts with anti-administrativist 
judges may well prove more important than Supreme Court doctrine in transforming the shape of 
administrative law. 
 
B.  Constraining the Administrative State  
 
It is also worth highlighting a central feature that, despite their differences, the radical and 
incrementalist approaches share:  Both involve an assertion of greater judicial control over the 
administrative state and justify that greater role for courts on concerns about the dangers of 
expanding administrative power.  Indeed, skepticism about administrative government may well 
be the consistent driver animating Roberts Court administrative law, albeit given full sway under 
Justice Gorsuch’s radicalism and tamped down under Justice Kagan’s incrementalism.  
 
A striking characteristic of many Roberts Court administrative law opinions is their sharp 
rhetorical attack on the administrative state and bureaucracy.  Chief Justice Roberts deserves the 
top award for the most pointed prose in this regard.  His reference in Free Enterprise to a “vast 
and varied federal bureaucracy” that “wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily 
life” is a prime example, and his description in City of Arlington v FCC of “hundreds of federal 
agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life” is equally evocative.291  Several other 
justices have made disparaging remarks about the bureaucracy as well, often quoting Roberts’s 
language in Free Enterprise.  Justice  Gorsuch in particular repeatedly positions judges as the 
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protectors of “the unpopular and vulnerable” against “bureaucrats”292 and “a bureaucrat’s 
caprice.”293  He echoed these sentiments to some extent in Kisor, invoking the administrative 
state’s “explosive growth,” and “self-interested” bureaucrats with shifting whims.”294  But the 
2018 Term decisions were relatively tame and balanced on the rhetorical front, with Chief Justice 
Roberts in particular holding his fire. Perhaps the attacks on the “deep state” that currently 
dominate the political arena convinced the justices that similar bureaucracy bashing by the Court 
would be inappropriate.295  
 
Instead, what surfaced clearly in the 2018 Term opinions was a more principled debate 
over the relevance of bureaucratic expertise.  As noted above, both Justice Kagan in Kisor and 
Justice Breyer in Department of Commerce portrayed expertise as a central benefit of 
administrative government and one that administrative law doctrine should be tailored to foster.  
Thus, Kagan precluded Auer deference from applying to administrative interpretations of 
regulations that did not “in some way implicate its substantive expertise” while Breyer relied 
heavily on the contrary and documented views of agency experts in concluding that Ross’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.296  By contrast, Justice Gorsuch elevated judicial expertise 
over that of bureaucrats, arguing that it was ultimately for courts to weigh “the expert agency’s 
views” against “competing expert and other evidence supplied in an adversarial setting.”297  And 
Chief Justice Roberts insisted on the primacy of an agency’s political officials over its experts, 
emphasizing that agency decisions are legitimately driven by political priorities.  This is a point 
Roberts has made before, most notably arguing in Free Enterprise that “[o]ne can have a 
government that functions without being ruled by functionaries, and a government that benefits 
from expertise without being ruled by experts.”298  Justice Thomas also has voiced skepticism of 
arguments for deference based on administrative expertise, identifying them as misplaced and 
historically rooted in the progressives’ “belief that bureaucrats might more effectively govern the 
country than the American people.”299 
 
Yet these disagreements over bureaucratic expertise should not obscure the similarities in 
these accounts.  All the justices ended up supporting greater judicial scrutiny of administrative 
decisionmaking in some form, whether by restricted deference to agency interpretations, 
heightened scrutiny of agency policy determinations, or both.  As significant, they did so invoking 
the need to guard against the danger of excessive administrative power.  Even Justice Kagan in 
Kisor argued “that administrative law doctrines must take account of the far-reaching influence of 
agencies and the opportunities such power carries for abuse.”300  Granted, what the justices view 
as the danger posed by expanded administrative government varies in important ways.  As I have 
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previously argued, at times justices stress the danger of aggrandized administrative power 
threatening individual liberty, at others the fear is that administrative power is politically 
unaccountable.301 In Department of Commerce Justice Breyer suggested a different account, 
implying that the real danger was too much political control of administrative power,302 while the 
Chief Justice focused on the traditional concern that exercised of administrative power must be 
reasoned and not arbitrary.303  And in Kisor and Gundy, Justice Gorsuch repeatedly portrayed 
administrative power as biased as well as aggrandized, worsening the threat to individual liberty.304  
Despite these differences, the consistent theme is of the potential dangers of administrative 
government. 
 
Notably lacking from the 2018 Term decisions, and from Roberts Court administrative law 
generally, is a robust defense of the administrative state.  The contribution that bureaucratic 
expertise makes to better decisionmaking and effective government is a central benefit of 
administrative agencies.305 But administrative agencies serve other critical functions too.  
Bureaucracy works to constrain as well as empower government, through close supervision and 
enforcement of legal controls on government actors.  Administrative government is also essential 
for ensuring political accountability; it is agencies implementing statutes through regulations and 
enforcement that put democratically adopted policy into operation.306  And administrative agencies 
are equally important to securing individual liberty, by protecting individuals against abuses of 
private power and ensuring access to the basic goods (safe food, a clean environment, protection 
against private exploitation, and so on) needed for a full and free life.  The D.C. Circuit 
underscored this point recently in its en banc majority opinion in PHH Corporation v CFPB. 
There, in rejecting the claim that a single-headed agency with removal protection posed a greater 
threat to individual liberty than a multi-member commission, Judge Pillard emphasized the liberty 
benefits of financial regulation:   
 
It remains unexplained why we would assess the challenged removal restriction 
with reference to the liberty of financial providers, and not more broadly to the 
liberty of individuals and families who are their customers. … Congress understood 
that markets’ contribution to human liberty derives from freedom of contract, and 
that such freedom depends on market participants’ access to accurate information, 
and on clear and reliably enforced rules against fraud and coercion.307 
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For that matter, financial regulation also advances liberty interests of regulated parties, for example 
by guarding against abusive tactics that can wreak financial havoc or destroy consumer trust in an 
industry.   
 
What would a fuller defense of administrative government have looked like in the 2018 
administrative law decisions?  In Department of Commerce, more emphasis could have been put 
on how the Census Bureau’s actions represented an internal bureaucratic effort to reinforce 
democracy and the rule of law..  Policysetting by top political appointees is certainly an important 
form of political accountability, as Chief Justice Roberts insisted.  But there is surely also a 
political accountability benefit to resisting actions by political leaders that threaten the basic 
representative structure of our political system, as well as an important rule of law value in 
ensuring that political leaders do not abuse government power for partisan gain.  In Kisor, it could 
have meant more of an argument for interpretive deference precisely because such deference 
allows agencies to interpret ambiguous regulations in ways that they believe will best advance 
their regulatory goals.  Although for Gorsuch this amounts to self-serving and liberty-threatening 
bias, that assumes that public agencies are no different than private parties.  A more robust defense 
of administrative government would reject that equation, and instead emphasize how effective 
implementation of statutes and regulations can be liberty enhancing and in the public interest.  The 
same liberty-enhancing argument could have been developed in defense of broad delegations in 
Gundy; such delegations can enhance liberty by ensuring that government is able to respond 
quickly and effectively to new private abuses of power as they arise.  In fairness, Justice Breyer’s 
and Kagan’s opinions hinted at these arguments, with Breyer mentioning the importance of an 
accurate census to democracy and Kagan underscoring agencies’ knowledge and value to 
Congress.308 But for the most part they emphasized neutral-sounding administrative expertise and 
did not develop a broader account of how the administrative state reinforces the constitutional 
order.  
 
Failing to note these potential benefits leads to a one-sided portrayal of the administrative 
state as inherently a threat to democracy, rule of law, and liberty.  And this one-sidedness in turn 
suggests that the ultimate goal of Roberts Court administrative law may be to pull back on 
government on ideological and political grounds, rather than because doing so advances 
constitutional values or some other principled basis.  That perception should be a concern even for 
conservative justices who are deeply skeptical of administrative government.  As important, a more 
balanced account of agencies’ strengths and weaknesses is needed for the Roberts Court to develop 
a coherent approach to administrative law.  Absent a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of administrative government, the Roberts Court’s administrative law decisions are 
unlikely to rise above the level of ad hoc and occasionally inconsistent interventions. 
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